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ABSTRACT 
REASONS FOR LOCAL SMART GROWTH EFFORTS:  AN EVALUATION OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH CAPITAL PROGRAM AND ITS OUTCOMES IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
 
MAY 2011 
 
JIA JIA, B.S., PEKING UNIVERSITY 
 
M.S., PEKING UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Elisabeth M. Hamin 
 
The Massachusetts model illustrates the latest approach to smart growth - the 
incentive based program.  This study examines the reasons for and actual outcomes 
of local smart growth efforts through one of the Massachusetts’ smart growth 
incentives - the Commonwealth Capital (CC) Program.  
The main objectives of this research are built on two conceptual models 
through a mixed approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methods.  The 
qualitative method is mainly utilized to evaluate the implementation of the CC 
program.  The results indicate that the program is a good measure of municipal smart 
growth efforts representative of goals of the state.  Communities with diverse land 
bases have some advantage, as a variety of zoning methods can be employed.  It is 
not obvious that communities have changed their own zoning in response to the 
stimuli of the CC program. 
 - vii - 
The first model is applied through various statistical tests to investigate the 
relationships among the towns’ characteristics and CC data.  Homeownership, 
education and access to the highway system are significant factors related to 
municipal smart growth efforts in Massachusetts.  Wealth, population and quantity 
of open spaces are only significant for certain type of communities (e.g. maturing 
suburbs, developing towns etc).  Municipal political preferences (e.g. forms of 
municipal governance, DEM/GOP preference etc) and municipal planners’ efforts 
have some influence on the adoptions of smart growth policies, though the specific 
outcomes might vary case by case.  
The second model tests the statistical relationships between CC data and the 
Urban Sprawl in Massachusetts.  The urban sprawl are defined by Urban Sprawl 
Indicator (USI) as the amount of residential land consumed per building permit in the 
five past years per community in Massachusetts.  The CC scores and USIs 
negatively fit the regression line well, indicating that local smart growth efforts have 
generally controlled land consumption in the past.  In particular, the USIs in 
developing suburbs appear more responsive to the CC data.  The spatial lag model 
shows sprawl is a net-effect phenomena and the cluster of sprawl in a region might 
weaken the effectiveness of particular municipal smart growth efforts.  
Lastly, this research suggests that the design of state land use policies ought to 
follow the nature of geographic segmentation of municipal smart growth preferences.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
Urban sprawl usually means low-density development and inefficient use of 
land.  Sprawl is associated with numerous problems in environmental, social, 
transportation, economic and public health arenas.  Urban sprawl has been a 
common problem in the US since the middle of the twentieth century and has had 
significant effects in many aspects of people’s lives.  Sprawl is often characterized 
by a rate of increase in land consumption that exceeds the rate of population growth. 
For example, Fulton et al. (2001) found most metropolitan areas in the United States 
were adding urbanized land at a much faster rate than they are adding population. 
Irwin and Bockstael (2002) showed rates of conversion to residential land use have 
far exceeded population growth rates in the urban fringe areas, leading to a 
low-density, noncontiguous, and land-intensive development pattern.  Although 
urban sprawl has created opportunities for significantly higher levels of housing and 
land consumption for most households in the past several decades, the gains have not 
come without associated costs (Nechyba 2004). 
In response to the challenges of sprawl, growth management (GM), and its 
updated form, smart growth (SG), have gained currency as policy responses seeking 
to reduce the incidences of urban sprawl.  Many states have undertaken GM/SG 
efforts to build statutes and funding in the recent past.  Those efforts, however, have 
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met various challenges in the real world and the actual results have generated several 
debates in academia.   
One of the challenges of land use research is that land use and zoning 
decisions are highly individualized at the community level, therefore, it is difficult to 
generalize or compare meaningful metadata on local zoning practices.  Although 
many states require local reporting on zoning to the state body, few states have 
attempted to organize local zoning practices into a database that is useable for 
research.  A counterexample is Massachusetts, which has implemented a program 
called the Commonwealth Capital (CC) program , encouraging, but not mandating, 
towns and cities to fill out a standardized form to report on their zoning practices.  
Having such a unique and rich data source provides a unique opportunity to 
investigate the spatial zoning habits of towns and cities, as well as to investigate the 
connections between particular zoning practices and the extent of sprawl in the 
municipality.   
Although Massachusetts has been regarded as one of the leading sustainable 
states in the United States and was poised to play a leading role in helping the nation 
implement parts of the sustainable energy plan, it has some severe limitation in its 
ability to do so.  The state has a long tradition of “home rule,” meaning land has 
been developed under outdated zoning bylaws that can persist for a long time.  
Massachusetts’ law requires a two-thirds majority vote by the governing body of the 
municipality to change the local zoning bylaw and there is no consistency between 
local comprehensive plans and land use regulations.  This has constrained the ability 
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of municipalities to address growth problems in the recent past.  Furthermore, 
housing prices in Massachusetts are much higher than the national average, and the 
limited state funding for transportation, environmental protection, and housing is 
being spent in an uncoordinated and inefficient manner.   
The persistent efforts by planning advocates to improve the state’s outdated 
comprehensive planning laws and subdivision statutes have proved unsuccessful in 
the past twenty years in Massachusetts.  The state legislature, however, has been 
only partially successful in several of its initiatives to advance voluntary community 
planning in recent years.  The efforts were advocated by state government, but in 
many communities the impact of these reforms and incentives is reduced by current 
local planning statutes that encourage sprawling patterns of growth.  This research is 
going to examine this dilemma and try to discover the quantifiable outcomes of 
changes to trends in land use development resulting from an “incentive based smart 
growth” strategy1.  
The Massachusetts the Commonwealth Capital program makes it feasible to 
explore research objectives in a digital medium.  The Commonwealth Capital 
program is a state smart growth program based on a few incentive approaches and 
launched by the Romney administration in 2003.  As part of the program, it provides 
a standardized zoning reporting system for the 313 participating municipalities in 
Massachusetts.  Comparing these scores with land use changes over the period of the 
program allows insight into the effectiveness of the program and zoning across a 
variety of situations.  This research intends to evaluate the Commonwealth Capital 
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scoring system and apply the Commonwealth Capital scores through various models 
to evaluate the effectiveness of local smart growth efforts in Massachusetts.  
The significance of this research lies in two areas.  First is the incentive 
based smart growth context of Massachusetts: many advocates of smart growth (SG) 
argue that SG can only occur by states mandating local planning, but in 
Massachusetts, which has strong home rule and weak state mandates for land use 
planning, this is politically unlikely.  It is not clear, however, given other research 
that incentive based planning is strong enough to change development patterns, and 
this research will move toward answering that.  Second, the question of why towns 
undertake certain zoning practices remains unclear in the quantitative research, and 
gaining insight into this will help to direct the design state programs that are accepted 
by towns.  This research will not only contribute to the smart growth theories 
regarding the reasons for and the outcome patterns of the policies, but it will also 
contribute to the methodologies of evaluating smart growth policies and defining 
urban sprawl. 
1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The scope of my research will be mainly focused on the years from 1999 to 
2009.  Most of the smart growth policies in the Commonwealth Capital program 
were adopted after 2003.  The study area of this research is within the jurisdictional 
boundary of Massachusetts’ 351 municipalities.   
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The ultimate purpose of this research is to support the design of effective 
state-level smart growth policies in the United States, particularly in states that may 
choose to focus on incentive-based policies rather than mandating local regulatory 
change.   This research uses the policies of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to 
test the efficacy of voluntary or incentive-based state policy approaches.  The 
primary data source is a set of models built from Massachusetts’ Commonwealth 
Capital data.  Therefore, this research examines the following major objectives: 
? Objective I: Evaluating the Commonwealth Capital program 
? Objective II: Applying the Commonwealth Capital data to examine 
smart growth policies in Massachusetts. 
For the first objective, this research will answer these questions:  
? Do Commonwealth Capital scores really reflect the towns’ smart growth 
efforts in Massachusetts?  
? Are rural and urban communities scored fairly through the CC criteria 
system? 
? Has the Commonwealth Capital program goal to incentivize 
communities to practice smart growth policies by giving high scoring been achieved? 
For the second objective, this research is going to build two conceptual models 
(see the figure 1.1) and answer the questions: 
? Model I: What socio-economic factors influenced the local smart growth 
efforts in MA’s towns in the past decade? Do the spatial characteristics of 
 - 6 - 
social-economic factors also contribute to the adoptions of smart growth policies in 
MA’s towns? 
? Model II: Were good land use policies (measured as higher CC scores) 
associated with less urban sprawl?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The Conceptual Models 
In Model I, Towns’ Characteristics (X) are independent variables and smart 
growth policies (CC) are dependent variables, which can be denoted by the equation: 
CC = F ( X ).  In Model II, smart growth policies (CC) are independent variables and 
Urban Sprawl Indicators (USI) are dependent variables, and their relationships can be 
denoted by the equation: USI = F (CC). 
 
 
                                                 
1 The concept of incentive-based smart growth was first brought up by Prof. 
Elisabeth Hamin in 2008 during a discussion of my research objectives. 
Towns’ 
Characteristics 
Smart Growth 
Policies (CC) 
Urban Sprawl 
Indicators (USI) 
CC = F( X ) USI = F ( CC ) 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Various authors have evaluated state level growth management/smart growth 
(GM/SG) programs in the past, and the views of those evaluations are mixed.  The 
following is a brief summary on the history, goals and evaluations of GM/SG 
programs. 
2.1 Three Waves of the GM/SG Movement 
John DeGrove (1984; 1992; 2005) developed a “three-wave” model to 
chronicle the evolution of the growth management movement.  In the first wave 
during the 1970s, seven states enacted growth management programs as a way of 
advancing environmental protection.  These programs were based on the regulation 
of land development either throughout the state or within specially designated zones. 
Most of the states’ early responses to environmental issues were single-purpose state 
land use control measures, such as North Carolina and California’s coastal area 
zoning and Florida’s Water Management Act.  Oregon’s growth management 
program was comprehensive, with the system extending to all lands in the state in the 
1970s (Degrove 1992).  
The second wave, from the 1980s into the early 1990s, “marked a shift from 
controlling growth to planning for growth” (Ingram et al. 2009).  State level growth 
management broadened its definition in this period in contrast to the strong natural 
systems orientation in 1970s (Degrove 1992).  Degrove (1992) argued that although 
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there was continuing concern in environmental protection, especially for farm and 
forest land issues, growth management addressed a wide range of quality of life 
values in the 1980s.  In addition, “new concerns have been addressed in various 
growth management programs, such as keeping abreast of infrastructure needs as 
development occurs, properly balancing development and environmental protection, 
and promoting economic development” (DeGrove 1992).  During this period the 
responsibility for important public policies was reallocated among state, regional, and 
local governments (DeGrove 1992).  It was also a period when the deployment of 
infrastructure became more important as a land use planning tool (Ingram et al. 2009).  
DeGrove (2005) calls the third wave, beginning in the late 1990s, the shift to 
smart growth with a renewed emphasis on economic development.  Smart growth 
has been regarded as a more design-oriented and business-friendly successor to 
growth management (Hamin et al. 2006).  This period marked the evolution from an 
anti-growth to a growth-accommodating movement, with statewide efforts focused on 
policies to revitalize cities, reform local zoning to encourage compact development 
and infill, coordinate state agencies and their growth policies, and overhaul capital 
investments to align with a sustainable agenda (Ingram et al. 2009).  Ingram et al. 
(2009) argue that the Massachusetts model, which is based on Commonwealth Capital 
program, illustrates the latest approach to smart growth and the incentive-based 
programs characterize the third wave of smart growth.  
The possible fourth wave of smart growth policies has been suggested by 
Ingram et al. (2009) as the campaign to help achieve sustainable energy goals and 
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emission reduction goals.  In an effort to meet emissions reduction goals, states will 
turn to land use planning which will benefit development proposals that adhere to a 
smart growth framework.  In addition, households will limit their travel costs to save 
energy, so market forces will encourage more compact, mixed-use development 
(Ingram et al. 2009, 9). 
2.2 Primary Goals of Smart Growth Policies 
In Degrove’s (1992) view, the goal of growth management is to achieve a 
responsible balance between the protection of natural systems and the development 
requirement to support growth in residential, commercial and retail areas.  Growth 
management has introduced important new concepts to planning, including 
consistency, concurrency and compact urban form, as well as natural resource 
protection, affordable housing and economic development. 
Nelson (1995) researched growth management principles and practices and 
demonstrated five purposes of state level growth management, including: prevention 
of urban sprawl, taxpayer protection, the economic purposes of growth management, 
issues of efficient urban form, and relation to quality of life.  He also added that 
growth management was an important way to protect taxpayers from imprudent 
private investment decisions resulting in over building; government intervention, in 
part through growth management, can correct the inefficient land development 
patterns created by “market failure.”   
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Although “smart growth” has been regarded as the successor of growth 
management and is opposed to the term “sprawl”, it was initially an amorphous term 
in the planning lexicon.  Ye (2005) finds that smart growth has been defined by 
different environmental organizations, government agencies, and interest groups in 
their own ways to achieve their particular missions and goals.  He synthesized a 
unified definition of smart growth by six dimensions (see table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Main Elements of Smart Growth Policies (Ye 2005) 
 
Main Elements of Smart Growth Policies 
Planning Transportation Economic Development 
Comprehensive planning  
Mixed land uses  
Increased density  
Street connectivity  
Alternative/innovative water  
infrastructure and systems  
Public facilities planning 
Pedestrianization  
Facilities for bicycling  
Public transit promotion  
Systems integration and 
nodal networks  
Neighborhood business  
Downtown revitalization  
Infill development  
Using existing infrastructure  
Housing Community Development Natural Resource Preservation 
Multifamily housing  
Smaller lots  
Manufactured homes  
Housing for special needs  
and diverse households  
Popular participation  
Recognizing/promoting the 
unique  
features of each community 
Farmland preservation  
Subdivision conservation  
Easement conservation  
Transferable development right  
Purchase of development rights  
Historical preservation  
Ecological land preservation  
2.3 Evaluating Smart Growth Policies 
2.3.1 Definitions of Three Dimensions to Evaluate Policies 
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Policy evaluation often uses equity, efficiency, and effectiveness as central 
policy criteria.  GM/SG programs overlap each other in terms of those three 
definitions and purposes. 
Equity:  
Equity refers to the distribution of benefits and costs among the population, 
and the degree to which that distribution is considered fair and appropriate (Litman 
2007).  The topics of equity in terms of GM/SG could cover affordable housing, 
Massachusetts transit with local income access, job housing balance, development 
without displacement, preventing residential segregation, and many other topics 
relating to sustainable development (Saha 2008; Scott 2007; Carruthers 2002).   
Efficiency: 
Efficiency in terms of urban development usually means that land develops in 
an economically organized way; for instance, discontinuous urban development is 
inefficient, because it fails to make use of the most accessible land, in addition, 
certain urban public services such as roads and sewage systems may be relatively 
expensive in such development.  Compared to efficiency, equity answers the 
question of “how much tradeoff there will be between more social fairness and faster 
growth (Blair 1984)”. 
Effectiveness:  
Effectiveness covers much more comprehensive criteria in evaluating SG/GM 
compared with the other two dimensions.  Carruthers (2002) divided the evidence of 
growth management policies’ effectiveness into three criteria: the residential property 
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values; the spatial structure of metropolitan areas, and public service expenditure.  
Some other studies define growth management effectiveness by evaluating specific 
growth management programs in terms of the degree to which growth management 
programs’ goals have been achieved during their implementations (Landis 2006; 
Hamin et al. 2006). 
These three dimensions to evaluate the GM/SG overlap each other in their 
definitions and purposes.  The evaluation in this research will be more associated 
with the effectiveness dimension of smart growth policies, since it covers 
comprehensive aspects of the policy impact and is also strongly related to the other 
two dimensions.   
2.3.2 Framework to Evaluate GM/SG Policies 
Evaluating the effectiveness of smart growth policies has been a controversial 
topic in the past.  Many authors have evaluated the effectiveness of GM/SG in 
different ways and the outcomes of evaluation are mixed.  Most studies evaluating 
smart growth are related to whether the regulations achieved their stated purpose, and 
attempt to examine the “intention” and “outcome” sides of the GM/SG policies. 
Carruthers (2002) created an analytic framework for evaluating regulatory 
growth management programs, which can be considered an overview for analyzing 
smart growth policies (figure 2.1).  He claims the rationale of land use regulations 
consists three basic objectives: maintaining residential property values, shaping a 
compact urban form, and promoting efficient public service provision.  Figure 2.1 
can be applied to examine whether those goals have been achieved by the 
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consistencies among different policy levels, institutional framework and land market 
characteristics.  This dissertation regards Carruthers’ framework as the standard to 
examine local smart growth efforts.  The urban sprawl indicators denote the 
outcomes of policies and consider the institutional framework and smart growth 
incentives the factors that influence the policy outcomes in Massachusetts.  
In the study Carruthers also indicates that state growth management programs 
with strong consistency requirements and enforcement mechanisms held much 
promise for reducing urban sprawl, while programs that do not require consistency or 
have weak enforcement mechanisms may inadvertently contribute to it.  
Massachusetts does not require any consistency among state and local plans, and even 
municipal zoning regulations do not have to be consistent with local comprehensive 
plans.   
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Figure 2.1 Framework for Evaluating GM/SG (Carruthers 2002)  
 
2.3.3 Methods for Evaluating GM/SG Programs 
Many studies have been carried out to evaluate the GM/SG programs and 
utilizing various methodologies to achieve the evaluation goals.  
As a good example of a qualitative evaluation of a state level growth 
management program, Weitz (1999) studied the state-sponsored land use planning in 
four states - Florida, Georgia, Oregon and Washington - through six evolution 
OUTCOME
INTENTION
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periods.   His evaluation at growth management program can be divided into three 
dimensions:  
1) Structure - the “mandate designer” (intergovernmental structure), he 
analyzed the content of state statutes to identify the intergovernmental divisions of 
authority and responsibility legislators used to implement land use planning, where he 
also studied the planning review structures and discussed the consistency issues (the 
consistency diagram); 2) Standards - Minimum planning standards for local 
comprehensive plans, where he studied the administrative rules to identify strength of 
local policies; 3) Support - The structures and program features that support local and 
regional comprehensive planning in the state growth management departments, where 
he researched the departmental annual reports, program designs, budgets, 
organizational charts and so on, in order to examine the levels of support by the state 
administrations.   
In Weitz’s study, the state level planning reviewing structure and consistency 
issues are considered two key factors that determine the success of growth 
management programs. 
Landis’ study (2006) evaluated local growth control and management 
programs (LGC&M) in California, by asking the questions:  
 
“1) To what extent do different growth management approaches really restrict 
the amount, pace, or location of growth?  2) To what extent are growth 
management program results reflected in local real estate prices, especially 
housing prices?  3) Do growth management programs systematically displace 
growth from more restrictive to less restrictive communities?” 
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Because California lacks a statewide Growth Management framework, the 
effectiveness of Growth Management can evaluated solely by its local 
implementation.  Landis’ study gives an example of evaluating Growth Management 
programs at a local level.  Landis first identified a representative sample of case 
study jurisdictions with LGC&M programs in place in 1995 and distinguished them 
with a number of LGC&M criteria, such as communities with residential growth caps, 
residential APFOs (Adequate Public Facilities Ordinances), binding urban growth 
boundaries and limit lines and so on.  Then, he compared those sample jurisdictions 
with selected peer cities that had similar sizes and locations in terms of their 
population and dwelling unit growth.  Then he calculated the surpluses and shortfalls 
of housing production by comparing the estimated housing demand based on nearby 
job growth with the actual housing supply by permit activities.  Then, he built a 
statistical model to examine whether the surpluses and shortfalls of housing matched 
the existence of LGC&M programs.  His evaluation covers Growth Management 
techniques in details and the statistical methods applied in his research provides a 
good framework for evaluating the Growth Management techniques in other studies.  
Nelson (1995) reviewed past studies in regard to evaluating the efficient urban 
form and introduces “simulation” as a method of evaluating Growth Management.  
This includes the simulations of energy and accessibility among six different 
archetypal urban development patterns as well as simulations of alternative 
development patterns on vehicle-miles traveled (VMT).  
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Hamin et al. (2006) evaluated the state-led Growth Management program 
Community Preservation Act (CPA) in Massachusetts, in terms of policy flexibility.  
She studied the CTA ballots across 351 communities and discussed its statistical 
distribution.  In addition, the expenditure of CPA funding in various categories has 
been analyzed according to the towns’ rural and urban characteristics.  
A sharp critic with profound insight, Anthony Downs focused most of his 
studies on questioning the land use regulatory outcomes.  He argues (2005) that 
smart growth was originally driven by special interest groups including 
nongovernmental environmentalists, urban planners, some local public officials and 
innovative private real estate developers.  They failed to include the significant 
numbers of plain citizens, which could cause a lot of problems including: 
redistributing benefits and costs of development; shifting power and authority from 
local to regional levels; increasing residential density; raising housing prices; failing 
to reduce traffic congestion; increasing the “red tape” of new development; restricting 
profits for owners of outlying land; replacing “disjointed incrementalism” with 
regional planning.  
In addition, many recent studies of the regulatory impact on sprawl are related 
to open space protection (Bengston et al. 2004; Howell-Moroney 2004), 
transportation (Levine et al. 2007) and land preservation (Daniels et al. 2005).  For 
example, Howell-Moroney (2004) examined three hypotheses about whether higher 
socioeconomic status, fast growth and community age were related to the adoptions of 
open space policies in suburban areas of Philadelphia through a Logistic Regression 
 - 18 - 
Model.  He defined the factor of levels of socioeconomic status as the number of 
households with incomes over $ 100K, percentage white and median housing value.  
The fast growing communities were denoted by acreages consumed by residential and 
commercial development between 1990 and 1995.  The age of the community was 
measured by the median age of the housing stock during a specific period.  
Howell-Moroney’s findings are straightforward: newer, high-status communities with 
more loss of land to development are more likely to opt for open space preservation as 
a policy avenue.  
Some of the above scholars also discussed the spatial characteristics of local 
municipalities adopting state-based smart growth policies in their evaluations.  For 
example, Landis (1986; 1992) found that LGC&M programs were associated with an 
increased likelihood of infill development in the cities that adopt them, and with 
growth displacement to nearby communities (Landis, 2006).  Hamin et al. (2006) 
found when more money went to urban and suburban communities, who tended to 
spend more on affordable housing, those areas have actually benefited greatly from 
the legislation (Community Preservation Act) in Massachusetts. 
2.3.4 Measuring “Plan Quality” 
Despite the amount of research evaluating smart growth in recent years, the 
principles behind the policies were seldom studied, especially when the smart growth 
policies were adopted at the local level and lacked mandated enforcement by the state.  
Only recently have scholars begun researching plan quality and measuring the 
conformity between policies’ intentions and outcomes. 
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 In these studies plan quality is typically measured by how well local 
comprehensive plans and policies adhereds to smart growth principles.  Those 
regulatory items were categorized by intensity and presence during the measurement 
(Brody 2005, 2006; Edwards 2007).  In addition, plans are rated according to their 
conformity or “outcome to intentions”, meaning the degree to which decisions, 
outcomes, or impacts adhere to the objectives, instructions, or intent expressed in a 
policy or plan (Brody 2005).   
In 2005, Brody performed an empirical test on the plans’ conformity in 
Florida.  He compared the spatial pattern of wetland development permits over a 10 
year period in Florida with the original land use design of comprehensive plans.  He 
first measured the extent of clustered patterns of permits granted for wetland 
development by a Moran's I statistic and then examined the degree of conformity by 
identifying the permits that were located within the designs of land use plans.  His 
findings indicate that development patterns that significantly deviated from the 
original intent of the adopted plans tend to occur in specific locations and under 
certain conditions.  In addition, plans containing specific requirements of 
implementation and the environment are correlated with a greater degree of plan 
implementation.  
In 2006, Brody et al. examined sprawl-reduction planning policies (SRPPs) by 
evaluating forty six comprehensive plans in southern Florida. They consider five 
indices of sprawl-reduction planning policies: Transfer of Development Rights, 
Conservation Easements, Environmental Mitigation/Restoration, and Clustering and 
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Density Bonuses, and analyze the statistical and spatial pattern of SRPPs across the 
study area.  Through multiple regression analysis, they found that jurisdiction’s with 
wealthier populations have significantly lower instances of SRPPs in their plans while 
jurisdictions with higher levels of education adopt significantly more 
sprawl-mitigation policies.  Greater planning-agency capacity leads to stronger 
sprawl-mitigation measures within local comprehensive plans.  This study represents 
a new trend whereby researchers begin to think over the reasons for land use policies 
in a cultural and institutional senario and are trying to find the natural principles 
behind local land use regulations.  
Edwards et al. (2007) evaluated a sample of thirty local comprehensive plans 
in Wisconsin to determine how well local plan goals and policies promote smart 
growth principles.  She categorized those policies as being action-oriented and 
specific (under specific conditions) versus general (vague) and non-action-oriented, to 
define their intensity toward smart growth goals.  Their research reveals that rural 
communities are significantly different from urban communities in regard to some 
specific smart growth policies, including creating housing choice, transportation 
choice and walkable streets, and fostering attractive and distinctive communities.  As 
another notable finding, they show that small towns had relatively lower smart growth 
scores than their urban counterparts because those smart growth policies were not 
applicable or useful in such areas with smaller size, lower economic bases and less 
complicated political institutions.  These findings are particularly relevant to 
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Massachusetts with its many small and undeveloped towns.  It will be interesting to 
compare Edwards et al.’s conclusions with the findings in this research.  
2.4 Urban Sprawl and Measuring Urban Sprawl 
2.4.1 The Definitions of Urban Sprawl 
Although urban sprawl has created opportunities for significantly higher levels 
of housing and land consumption for most households in the past several decades, the 
gains have not come without costs (Nechyba 2004).  Urban sprawl usually means 
low-density development and inefficient use of land, and it has caused a number of 
problems in the environmental, social, transportation, economic and public health 
realms.  
There have been many policy related reasons that directly or indirectly caused 
urban sprawl throughout United States history, including the federal investment in 
countrywide highway system in the 1960s; the abandonment of public transportation 
system by early American planners; the federally subsidized housing programs that 
helped the post war economy boom; taxation systems and policies; energy policies; 
intergovernmental relations and so on (Nivola, 1999).  Urban Sprawl, regarded as 
the antithesis of urbanism since it is based on principles of “separation, segregation 
and inequity” (Talen 2005), has attracted the attention of scholars from various fields.   
Many of the early methods for measuring urban growth and sprawl are loosely 
derived from the “Monocentric City Model” associated with Alonso (1964), Mills 
(1967) and Muth (1969).  The assumption here is that there is a single center for the 
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metropolitan region, with densities gradients that gradually subside with movement 
out toward the periphery.  Based on this, sprawl is measured as the level of 
suburbanization by the population density gradient (Mieszkowski and Mills 1993).   
Recent research on measuring sprawl can be categorized into two types: first, 
measuring the sprawl patterns or forms with the assistance of Remote Sensing and 
GIS techniques; second, defining sprawl indicators using various statistical models.  
George Galster defines sprawl largely as a facet of urban spatial structure and 
form.  He identifies four general types of sprawling patterns as characterized by 
eight distinct dimensions of urban form: density, continuity, concentration, 
compactness, centrality, nuclearity, diversity, and proximity (Galster 2001; Cutsinge 
and Galster 2006).  Sprawl was also measured through a combination of statistical 
models and remote sensing imagery by Song (2004), Burchfield (2006), Martinuzzi 
(2007).  Burchfield et al. (2006) measure sprawl as the amount of undeveloped land 
surrounding an average urban dwelling by tracking remote sensing data in the years of 
1976 and 1992 in the United States.  They find that, overall, commercial 
development have been more sprawling than the residential sprawl over the past few 
decades.  Martinuzzi et al. (2007) applied a textural filter to the satellite data to 
calculate the proportion of developed pixels and non developed pixels in a 
surrounding area and compared them with population census data.  He associates 
sprawl with land consumption in excess of population growth.  Song et al. (2004) 
focuses on measuring sprawl at the neighborhood scale incorporating design-relevant 
measures urban form associated with sprawl, such as quantified variables of street 
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design and circulation systems, density, land use mix, accessibility, and pedestrian 
access. 
 
2.4.2 The Urban Sprawl Indicator 
Inspired by these definitions of urban sprawl, researchers have begun to look 
at land development patterns and socio-economic criteria to quantify the levels of 
urban sprawl, which can be termed urban sprawl indicators (USI).  USIs are utilized 
in various scenarios to measure the outcomes of state smart growth policies (Nelson 
1999; Kline 2000; Ji et al. 2006; Ingram et al. 2009).  My study follows a similar 
approach by defining a own USIs at the municipal level, to study sprawl in of 
Massachusetts.  Below are some examples of USIs that have been adopted in 
previous studies.  
Some researchers quantified sprawl as the change in population per acre of 
developed land, change in farmland per new resident and so on (Nelson 1999; Kline 
2000), while others define urban sprawl as “the process in which the spread of 
development across the landscape far outpaces population growth” (Ewing et al. 
2002)  and use measures similar to the Land Consumption Indicator (LCI), which is 
measured as a ratio of the percent change of built-up land coverage to the percent 
change in housing units (Ji et al. 2006).   
The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy recently completed new research which 
evaluated the effectiveness of smart growth policies by comparing four states with 
well-established statewide smart growth programs and four states that offered a range 
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of other land management approaches (Ingram et al. 2009).  The “outcomes” of the 
smart growth programs in this research can be regarded as a kind of definition of 
urban sprawl indicators, including five criteria: 1) growth patterns and trends (e.g. 
population Gini coefficient, developed land per 1000 population change, etc); 2) 
natural resources and environmental quality; 3) whether they provide and promote a 
variety of transportation options (e.g. average shares of commuter trips by public 
transportation by county type, etc.); 4) affordable housing (e.g. change for 
cost-burdened owners and renters, etc.) ; 5) fiscal dimensions (e.g. per capital 
revenues and expenditures at the county level, change in per capita property tax base 
and tax rate in urban/suburban counties, etc.). 
In a word, the urban sprawl indicator gives us a simple and quantified 
definition of urban sprawl and broadens the methodology to wrestle sprawl to the 
digitalized ground. 
2.5 Summary 
From the above discussion I conclude that Carruthers (2002)’s analytic 
framework gives us an integrated view of the components used to evaluate GM/SG 
policies.  The ultimate goal of GM/SG is to remedy urban sprawl and we can regard 
the outcome of Carruthers’ analytic framework as the comprehensive descriptions of 
urban sprawl criteria.  Those sprawl criteria have been quantified and applied to 
evaluate the effectiveness of state level smart growth policies over the past years.  
For example, the urban sprawl indicators utilized by Nelson (1999 utilized), Kline 
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(2000) and Ingram et al. (2009) cover all the dimensions of Carruthers’ policy 
outcomes of urban density, property value, public services and land area.  Then those 
indicators are compared in the states with various smart growth scenarios and finally 
the approximate rankings for those states in terms of their policies’ effectiveness are 
concluded.  
In this research I also attempt to quantify the sprawl outcomes of Carruthers’ 
analytic framework, unlike Song (2004), Burchfield (2006), and Martinuzzi (2007)’s 
work, which applies the statistic function to interpret satellite images, I intend to 
apply Nelson (1999), Kline (2000) and Ingram (2009)’s methods to create the sprawl 
indicators associated with urban density.  But the key urban sprawl indicators in this 
research are a little different from above researchers’ and are more close to Ji et al.’s 
(2006) Land Consumption Indicators.   The sprawl indicator will be interpreted as 
residential land change per new building.  The reason for this arrangement is that 
many of Nelson (1999), Kline (2000) and Ingram (2009)’s sprawl indicators are based 
on the state level land use data and population data.  There are few studies that 
define sprawl indicators at the local level.  The sensitivities of sprawl indicators are 
different when they are defined at different scales.  For example, the population Gini 
coefficient which is based on the county level population, and affordable housing 
indicator in Ingram et al.’s research are inappropriate for the towns of Massachusetts, 
because Massachusetts towns’ populations were relatively stable during past decades.  
The Gini coefficient could only be created by using census tracts, and comparing the 
distribution of the population at the census tract level cannot sensitively indicate the 
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sprawl level of each town.  Figure 2.2 (the Lorenz curve) indicates that Amherst has 
slightly less sprawl than Cambridge in term of population distribution, which is not 
true based on normal knowledge and sprawl definitions in this research (with the 
method in chapter 6, the urban sprawl indicator-USII(1999-2005) also proves Amherst has 
actually more sprawl than Cambridge with respective values of 1.28 and 0.93).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Population Gini Coefficient Analysis in MA  
 
Meanwhile, affordable housing only accounts for very small portion of 
housing development in many towns of Massachusetts.  Some towns do not have any 
affordable housing or a public transportation system, thus the affordable housing 
indicator cannot be applied generally to denote the sprawl level across Massachusetts.  
However, most recent development in Massachusetts has been newly 
constructed residential houses.  Therefore, I had the idea of creating urban sprawl 
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indicators based on the residential land change.  The accessibility to the building 
permit data of past decades also supported this idea.   That is how I decided to focus 
on a very specific urban sprawl indicator - the residential land change per new 
building to denote sprawl in the towns of Massachusetts.  
Alternatively, some researchers have studied the policy and institutional 
portions of Carruthers’ analytic framework and attempted to answer the question of 
whether the GM/SG purposes were achieved.  For example, Weitz (1999) researched 
the three dimensions of state level planning institutions and policies; Edwards et al. 
(2007) scores the intensity of planning policies that promote smart growth principles 
and reveals that the communities are not fully embracing the smart growth agenda;  
Hamin et al. (2006) quantifies the strength of the implementation of growth 
management legislation by categorizing the funding it raised and finds that the CPA is 
a flexible tool to aid communities in implementing a limited set of smart growth 
goals;  Landis (2006) numerically classifies the growth management jurisdiction 
samples by distinguishing them with a number of LGC&M criteria and finds that the 
LGC&M does very well in limiting the population growth, but have limited 
influences on housing price and growth displacement.  
Weitz’ s study is qualitative and Edwards (2007), Hamin (2006), Landis 
(2006) attempt to apply statistics to quantify the policy and institutional part of 
Carruthers’ analytic framework, which is what I intend to do in this research.  The 
Commonwealth Capital scores provide us a standardized data of local zoning 
practices and enable me to apply my ideas through this unique scoring system.  
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Although Edwards (2007), Hamin et al. (2006) and Landis (2006)’s studies 
teach the methods to quantify the policies and institutions, my main research 
objectives and process are quite different from theirs.  This work emphasizes 
researching the reasons for the existence of local smart growth efforts rather than 
discussing whether the quantified policy intentions have been achieved.  Although 
urban sprawl indicators are utilized in the second conceptual model, the measurement 
on policy itentions and land use outcomes is not so rigorious as the first conceptual 
model because of the data limitations. 
Some of the research in the above literature has adressed some points of my 
research, for example,  Brody’s (2006) findings of wealthy communities, Edwards 
(2006)’ of rural communities, and Hamin (2006)’s of suburban communities are 
supposed to be associated with the better/worse smart growth policies.  Enlightened 
by their methods, I intend to research the question of whether communities’ social 
economic status and spatial characteristics are associated with local smart growth 
efforts comprehensively in this dissertation.  My work takes a more comprehensive 
and complex approach than the previous studies, in which the reasons for local smart 
growth policies in recent years have not been significantly discussed.  
In a sum, this research attempts to quantify both the intention and outcome 
sides of Carruthers’ analytic framework using Commonwealth Capital data and urban 
sprawl indictors, and to discuss the reasons for smart growth policies and the 
effectiveness of smart growth policies in Massachusetts. 
 
.
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
This study adopts a mixed method approach combining regular/spatial 
statistics and qualitative research to examine the research questions and objectives 
(Creswell, 2009).  In this regard, the methodology of the study will be built upon 
insights gathered through the analysis of the literature, questionnaire-based interviews 
with Massachusetts planners and state administrators and statistical modeling.  
3.1 The Case for a Mixed Methods Approach 
Creswell (2009) points out the importance of mixed methods in social and 
human sciences: “the problems addressed by social and health science researchers are 
complex, and the use of either quantitative or qualitative approaches by themselves is 
inadequate to address this complexity...the interdisciplinary nature of research 
contributes to the formation of research teams with individuals with diverse 
methodological interests and approaches...” The combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methodological approaches in a mixed- methods framework is a step 
forward that utilizes the strengths of both approaches and offsets the inherent 
limitations of each.  In sum, there is more insight to be gained from the combination 
of both qualitative and quantitative research than either form by itself. (Creswell 
2009)” 
The objectives of this study are sufficiently complex to warrant the use of a 
mixed-methods approach.   Although the Commonwealth Capital program provides 
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unique and quantifiable indices of municipal zoning and growth management 
practices, quantitative models alone are not enough to fully explore the research 
questions.  For instance, the motivations underlying local smart growth efforts are 
complicated and often context specific.  While quantitative method are able to 
generalize findings across communities but cannot fully reveal the reasons behind 
decision within particular communities.  For another instance, two conceptual 
models in this research need to be supported through the evaluation of 
Commonwealth Capital (CC) program.  To evaluate CC program itself is a difficult 
objective because of the complexity and variaty of the data over the time.  It requires 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis to fully explain the phenomenon. 
According to Creswell, there are four factors that influence the design of a 
mix-methods research design: timing, weighting, mixing, and theorizing or 
transforming perspectives.   
Timing relates to whether the qualitative and quantitative data are collected 
sequentially or concurrently.  This study adopts a concurrent data collection strategy, 
in which both quantitative and qualitative databases are built simultaneously and both 
of them will be applied to address similar research questions.  As such, the designed 
questionnaire will cover most of the questions that will be examined by statistical 
models. 
Weighting reflects the relative primacy given to quantitative or qualitative 
research in a particular study.  This research is going to emphasize the quantitative 
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part of the methods and I intend to use the qualitative data to support the quantitative 
examinations. 
Theorizing or transforming perspectives provide the broad theoretical lens 
that guides the entire research design.  The multiple theories of smart growth policy 
and evaluation synthesized in the literature review provide an appropriate theoretical 
framework guiding this study.  For example, Fischel’s Homevoter Hypothesis (2001) 
will be regarded as supportive to the interpretations of quantitative/qualitative part of 
the research. 
These four factors help to shape the procedures of the mixed methods in the 
study.  More specifically, I adopt a Concurrent Embedded Strategy, which has a 
primary method that guides the project and a secondary database that provides a 
supporting role in the procedures (See figure 3.1).  Given less priority, the secondary 
method is embedded, or nested, within the predominant method.  This research will 
regard the quantitative method as the predominant method and qualitative part as the 
secondary database.  Those two methods will seek information at different level of 
analysis.  For example, the qualitative part of the research may address the issues of 
Object I in section 1.2 and answer the questions of whether the CC scores really 
reflect towns’ smart growth efforts, and what are the purposes and real outcomes of 
this program.  Those analyses are the main assumptions for the quantitative part of 
research, which is going to apply CC data in two statistical models.  
In addition, the Concurrent Embedded Strategy will also be utilized to answer 
the questions that quantitative analysis cannot fully explain.  For example, the 
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information on municipal planning staff are included in the model to answer the 
question: can efforts by towns’ planning departments influences the adoption of smart 
growth policies?  However, the database only indicates whether a town does or does 
not have a planner and lacks other measures to gauge municipal planning.  As such 
research question cannot be fully answered by quantitative analysis, it will be 
supplemented with the qualitative information gather through the detailed case 
studies.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Concurrent Embedded Design (Creswell 2009) 
 
Although the Concurrent Embedded Strategy covers most of the mixed 
method procedure in this search, a few specific research questions require other mixed 
method procedures.  For example, many town planners complained about the biases 
in CC criteria and thought the scoring system actually favored urban communities 
over rural communities.  The statistical method will address this research question 
after analyzing the qualitative information.  In another instance, the qualitative 
analysis suggests that the Commonwealth Capital program does not adequately 
promote smart growth policies as intended.  In this case, quantitative methods can 
help evaluate such claims by examining changes in municipal CC scores for 
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systematic changes.   The procedures of this kind of mixed method are called 
Sequential Exploratory Strategy (see figure 3.2)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Sequential Exploratory Design (Creswell 2009) 
 
In the next section, I am going to explain quantitative and qualitative research 
procedure separately and address the issues of how both databases have been 
constructed and merged, and continue to give examples on how mixed methods are 
utilized to achieve the research objectives.   
3.2 Quantitative Design 
The quantitative part of the methodological approach will be mainly applied to 
seek Objective II of section 1.2 – applying the CC data to evaluate the reasons for and 
outcomes of local smart growth efforts.  I develop a separate modeling approach to 
address two distinct research questions.  Model II will be interpreted by descriptive 
and graphical methods, bivariate correlation analysis, and a spatial regression model. 
Model I addresses the question of “What factors influenced the local smart 
growth efforts in Massachusetts’ towns in the past decade?” – primarily through  
multivariate statistical modeling.  The dependent variable is municipal 
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Commonwealth Capital scores, which represent the intensity of smart growth efforts 
in each town.  The independent variables are town characteristics, which include 
towns’ social-economic and political status, the spatial characteristics from towns’ 
typologies, towns’ government forms and planning resources and so on.   The 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multivariate regression model is applied to test the 
social-economic factors.  Spatial regression model (Auslin 1988, 1995, 2005; 
Michael 2008) is utilized in the investigation of those social-economic variables’ 
spatial effects.   
A genertic OLS model has the following form:  
yi  = βxi  + εi               (1) 
Where yi represents the dependent variable – in this instance the 
Commonwealth Capital scores - for i municipalities.  xi represents a a vector of 
explanatory variables– representing municipality social economic factors that may 
influence the adoption of smart growth strategies.  
I first estimate (1) using standard Ordinary Least Squares regression.  I then 
estimate regression models to correct for possible spatial dependence and help address 
the the question: Do the spatial characteristics of socio-economic factors also 
contribute to the smart growth efforts in Massachusetts’ towns?  There are two 
general types of approaches for addressing issues of possible spatial dependence: 1) 
the spatial lag (i.e. autoregressive) model and 2) the spatial error model.  
Anselin (1988) and Michael (2008) define the spatial lag model as: 
yi = β0 + β1 xi +ρ wi yi + εi            (2) 
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Where wi yi represents a spatially lagged form of the dependent variable and ρ 
represents an estimated parameter measuring the influence of the spatial lag.  The 
dependent variable yi is expressed as a response to several influences: yi in area Αi 
depends on the surrounding values yj (j ≠ i), through the term ρwy; it also depends on 
the general trend through βx.   
Michael (2008) defines the spatial error model as the following form: 
yi = xiβ + λwiξi + εi               （3） 
Where the overall error (ε in the standard OLS model) has been decomposed 
into two components: ε, a spatially uncorelated error term that satisfies the normal 
regression assumptions, and ξ, which is a term capturing the spatial component of 
the error term.  The estimated parameterλindicates the extent to which the spatial 
component of the errorsξare correlated with one another for nearby observations, as 
given by spatial weights matrix wi. 
I follow the suggest Anselin (2005) summarized the spatial regression model 
selection decision rules for choosing between these two common forms.  It gives us 
a standardized procedure for the spatial regression specification: begin the process at 
the top of figure 3.3 and run the standard Lagrange Multiplier (LM)- Error and 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM)- Lag test statistics.  If neither rejects the null hypothesis, 
use the regular OLS results.  If Moran’s I test statistic will not reject the null 
hypothesis, and one of the LM test statistics rejects the null hypothesis, and the other 
does not, then estimate the alternative spatial regression model that matches the test 
statistic that rejects the null.  When both LM test statistics reject the null hypothesis, 
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proceed to the bottom part of figure 3.3 and consider the robust forms of the test 
statistics. “Typically, only one of them will be significant or one spatial regression 
model matching the (most) significant statistic.  In the rare instance that both would 
be highly significant, go with the model with the largest value for the test statistic.” 
(Anselin 2005) 
 
Figure 3.3 Spatial Regression Model Decision Rule (Asline 2005) 
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In addition, I use independent samples T tests (2 groups of variables) and 
“One Way ANOVA- tests (3 and more groups of variables)  as the complementary 
tools to in the analysis of Model I.  Specifically, I apply these methods to examine 
the bivariate relationship of categorical explanatory variables such as government 
types, towns’ political preferences, town types, and planning employment status.  
Model II addresses the question of whether the adoption of smart growth 
policies is associated with less urban sprawl?  In this model, the Urban Sprawl 
Indicator (USI) representing changes of municipal land patterns, is the dependent 
variable (yi).  Commonwealth Capital scores representing smart growth policies are 
the independent variables (xi).  The examination of this model is limited by the 
approximate data to define proper USIs.  I use both bivariate correlation tests and 
bivariate regression test on the dependent and independent variables for various 
hypotheses.  The spatial regression model will also be adopted as a complementary 
examination to check the relationships among USIs and CCs.  In addtion, to have an 
approximate conclusion with direct observations, I will merge the interval data of 
some USIs into categorical data and compare those categories with CC scores through 
descriptive graphical methods.   
3.3 Qualitative Design 
The qualitative research will mainly address the questions: Do Commonwealth 
Capital (CC) scores really reflect towns’ smart growth efforts? What are the purposes 
and real outcomes of this program?  The additional possible sub-questions addressed 
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by qualitative analysis include: Why do some towns have high/low scores and why 
have the dramatic changes in CC scores occurred in specific towns during past years? 
Does the qualitative analysis reach same conclusions as the quantitative analysis in 
regard to some of the research questions? Why do some towns stop applying to the 
CC program or never apply? Does the CC program need to be improved, even if it 
really reflects part of towns’ smart growth efforts? How could one improve it? What 
are the weaknesses of this program?  
The qualitative part of this research will be applied as an embedded method to 
support the quantitative investigations.  This type of qualitative analysis is called “an 
inductive process of building from the data to broad themes to a generalized model or 
theory…The researcher begins by gathering detailed information from participants 
and then forms this information into categories or themes.  These themes are 
developed into broad patterns, theories, or generalizations that are then compared with 
personal experiences of with existing literature on the topic (Creswell, 2009)”. The 
conclusions/themes of the qualitative analysis will be merged with quantitative 
analysis in this research. 
The interview questionnaire, which covers most of the qualitative research 
themes and the digital recorder to record the interview procedure are used for the 
qualitative data collection.  The logic of this inductive approach is shown in figure 
3.3. 
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Figure 3.4 The Inductive Logic of Research in a Qualitative Study (Creswell  
2009, 63) 
According to the inductive process of qualitative analysis, I designed an 
interview questionnaire (see Appendices B) and will gather the qualitative data using 
the following steps:  
1) Data collection procedure: The discussion between researcher and 
interviewees will mainly focus on the themes in the interview questionnaire, and the 
questionnaire will be reviewed by the interviewees beforehand.  The whole interview 
process will be recorded by a digital voice recorder.  
2) Data recording procedure: An interview protocol will be used to transfer 
the audio materials into a theme formatted report.  The comment on the reliability 
and value of the data will be added at the end of each interviewee’s report. 
Researcher poses generalizations 
or theories from past experiences 
and literature 
Researcher looks for broad 
patterns, generalizations, or 
theories from themes or categories 
Researcher analyzes data to form 
themes or categories 
Researcher asks open-ended 
questions of participants or 
records field notes 
Researcher gathers information 
(e.g., interviews, observations)
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3) Data analysis and interpretation procedure: I am going to read through 
all the data and reports, and summarize the main themes.  The themes are major 
conclusions of qualitative investigation.   
The interviewees are divided into two groups of people: first, the town 
planners who coordinate the application of Commonwealth Capital program; second, 
the government officials and planning experts in the state. 
Regarding the first interview group, I narrowed down the study samples into 
six to seven municipalities because I didn’t anticipate great variability of their 
answers and I have limited time to travel.  The point of the sample selection is that 
the studied towns should be diverse enough to cover high/medium/low CC score 
towns and rural/suburban/urban towns.   For the second interview group I 
interviewed the people who worked at state planning agency or regional planning 
agency.  Table 3.1 demonstrates the interviewed towns in this research: 
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Table 3.1 The Interviewed Towns  
 
Results from the interviews will be presented in the quotation format and 
embedded in the dissertation to support various investigations.  The qualitative 
report is anonymous in this dissertation.  
3.4 Research and Data Limitations 
The hypotheses of constructing Model I and Model II in section 1.2 are: I 
assume the Commonwealth Capital (CC) program has generally reflected the towns’ 
efforts on smart growth policies.  The ranking of each town in this smart growth 
Town Name Town Type Mean  
CC 
Ranking 
(of 313) 
Populat
ion 
Interviewee Data 
Collection 
Process 
Bolton Developing 
Towns 
67 154 4,000 Town 
Planner 
Discussion, 
Observation 
Questionnaire 
Wellesley Maturing 
Suburbs 
72 120 27,000 Town 
Planner 
Discussion, 
Observation 
Sharon Maturing 
Suburbs 
71.6 124 17,000 Planning 
Engineer 
Discussion, 
Observation 
Questionnaire 
Ashby Rural Towns 60 197 3,000 Planning 
volunteer 
Discussion 
Seekonk Developing 
Towns 
44 261 13,000 Town 
Planner 
Discussion 
Northampton Regional Urban 
Centers 
127 1 30,000 Town 
Planner 
Discussion, 
Observation 
Amherst Regional Urban 
Centers 
104 9 35,000 Town 
Planner 
Questionnaire 
Hingham Maturing 
Suburbs 
95 28 20,000 Planning 
Expert 
Discussion 
Lincoln Maturing 
Suburbs 
80 79 8,000 Planning 
Expert 
Discussion 
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spectrum is relatively stable.  Therefore, the associations among towns’ 
characteristics, smart growth policies and land form were measurable.  These 
hypotheses are not perfect and it could lead to the contradictory research outcomes, 
particularly, when the CC data change from one year to the next in a specific town.  
However, the general principles of these hypotheses are reliable and the analysis has 
proved that CC scores in most of towns did not have drastic changes in past years.  
While CC scores are being used as a proxy for smart growth policy, they 
reflect the particular needs and policy goals of Massachusetts, and so the 
generalization is approximate.  Rather, I would consider CC data as a solid tool to 
open a window, through which I will look at a few aspects of Massachusetts’ smart 
growth status.  It is not completed examination.  
Second, the data from various sources are approximate.  The towns’ 
demographic data are from Census 2000, which is a long time ago, though 
Massachusetts has had a relatively stable population in past years.  Residential land 
change between year 1999-2005 is calculated through approximate geoprocessing 
method and the results are approximate.  Thus, the second statistical modeling 
(Model II in section 1.2) is approximate.  
Finally, I am particularly concerned about Model II and the question: did good 
land use policies lead to less urban sprawl?  The land change data are very recent, 
having been recorded between 1999 and 2005, and it usually takes years for smart 
growth incentives to take obvious effects.  So this measurement cannot accurately 
explain the policy’s effectiveness.  In addition, this test assumes that zoning is the 
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most important influence, but that is quite controversial: many other things influence 
development, for instance, the ridiculously high value of land in eastern 
Massachusetts, which represents the market force, may encourage density much more 
effectively than smart growth policies.  I will discuss this specific concern again in 
chapter 6.   
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CHAPTER 4  
THE EVALUATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH CAPITAL PROGRAM 
This chapter introduces and evaluates the Commonwealth Capital Program as 
a foundation for the analysis in the chapters to follow.  I begin with a brief 
discussion on the effects of institutional planning frameworks to covering smart 
growth policies across the US.  The incentive-based smart growth scenario in 
Massachusetts will be defined at the end of the discussion. 
4 .1 Effectiveness of Planning Institutional Framework  
4.1.1 State Planning Institutions Vs Local Planning Institutions 
In an overview of the institutional framework, Carruthers (2002) argues that 
the level of government (state, regional or local) leading smart growth efforts matters 
greatly to ultimate effectiveness of growth management.  Extra local institutions and 
policies, such as regional planning agencies and state land use legislation, tend to 
have more fundamental mechanisms for implementing growth management.  
Conversely, local efforts to GM/SG have been criticized for “distorting real estate 
price, creating exclusionary housing markets and contributing to urban 
sprawl”(Carruthers 2002).  Carruther suggests that the negative effects by local 
planning institutions are: “1) because of the home rule authority of local government, 
the communities in large metropolitan areas contribute to urban sprawl by 
establishing low residential densities and creating inconsistencies between the land 
use plans of adjacent jurisdictions; 2) some communities are unwilling to address 
 
-45-
growth related problems that extend beyond their borders; 3) some communities adopt 
exclusionary land use policies in reaction to region wide growth patterns; 4) the local 
planning agenda tends to be narrowly focused.” 
The relationships between state and local planning institutions can be reflected 
in the state’s mandate on local plans as well as state incentives to encourage 
consistency between state goals and local plans.  For example, starting in the late 
1960s, some state governments began requiring local governments to develop 
municipal plans.  For example, California required local governments to adopt 
general plans starting in 1971, and soon thereafter required them to bring their zoning 
ordinances into conformity with their plans; in 1973, Oregon adopted state-wide 
growth management legislation requiring local governments to adopt comprehensive 
plans that were consistent with a series of state goals.  Later on, Oregon’s state wide 
programs, such as urban growth boundaries (UGBs), drastically changed the land 
development pattern and have generated substantial discussion in academia during the 
past years.  Florida adopted a comprehensive program of “critical area” protection 
review, also requiring local governments to plan and conform to the state goals for the 
first time (Pendall 2006). 
On the other hand, some states have no state mandate or very weak state 
enforcement on the local plans.  For example, to meet the requirement of its state 
comprehensive planning laws, most of the municipalities in Georgia have local 
comprehensive plans, however, Georgia’s law does not require local governments to 
have “implementation consistency” and many studies regard Georgia as one of the 
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“laissez-faire” states that lack any statewide growth management mandates (Planning 
for Smart Growth 2002; Weitz 1999; Nelson 1999).  Massachusetts has not even 
attempted state level mandates on smart growth during past years (Hamin 2006); at 
the local level the zoning regulations don’t have to comply with local master plans 
and the state doesn’t have any enforcement power in local plan making.  The state 
smart growth efforts were partially circumvented by current local planning statutes.  
A planning-related executive order signed by former Governor Paul Cellucci 
(“Planning for Growth”) in 1996 firstly directs the state on the appropriate ways to 
undertake smart growth (Planning for Smart Growth 2002).  In recent years the state 
legislature initialized a few incentive approaches to advocate voluntary community 
planning to promote smart growth goals.  I will specifically discuss the 
Massachusetts’ planning institutional framework later in this chapter.  
Generally, recent studies reveal that the states of Florida and Oregon have 
successfully applied their state’s smart growth goals through what are arguably the 
strongest planning frameworks in the country.  In Georgia and Massachusetts, where 
incentives encourage local governments to develop plans voluntarily, the policies may 
have a limited ability to produce their intended effects (Ingram et al. 2009; Carruthers 
2002). 
4.1.2 Government Roles in Promoting Smart Growth 
Extra local institutions like state land use legislation have a great impact on 
consistency issues through the plan review process.  Weitz (1999) has clarified 
planning consistency into vertical and horizontal components (see figure 4.1).  
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“Implementation Consistency” represents that “regulations and implementing actions 
of local governments must be consistent with their comprehensive plans”, and it is an 
important indicator to test the plan’s effectiveness.  In the next section, I will focus 
on the plan reviewing process and the vertical/implementation consistency issues in 
various states to generalize the state government roles in promoting smart growth 
policies.  
 
 
Figure 4.1“Consistency” Issues in Planning (Weitz 1999) 
 
State Comprehensive Plan 
Regional 
Plan A 
Regional 
Plan B 
Local Plan A Local Plan B 
Local Plan 
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Local Plan 
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Local Development 
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Local Development 
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Vertical 
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Coordination 
Horizontal 
Coordination
Vertical 
Consistency 
Vertical 
Consistency 
Internal 
Consistency 
Implementation 
Consistency 
Implementation 
Consistency 
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From the above discussion we find that state governments have adopted 
flexible institutions to achieve their GM/SG goals in the US and the strength of 
consistency among the plans and regulations are controlled by the plan review process 
at the state planning agencies.  For example, Florida laws require each local 
government to submit its completed plans to the state land planning agency and the 
local planning agencies or commissions must evaluate proposed regulations for their 
relationships to the plans.  Land use regulations must be consistent with adopted 
comprehensive plans.  Florida has one of the most advanced laws in defining and 
applying the principle of vertical consistency.  In Oregon the state law clearly 
enunciates the implementation consistency requirement and the law also contains a 
vertical consistency mandate.  The DLCD (the Dept. of Land Conservation & 
Development) reviews the acknowledged comprehensive plans or land use 
regulations.  
The state of Washington requires the DCTE (the Department of Community, 
Trade & Economics) to review and update its local comprehensive plans for certain 
years and require all counties and cities to take specific actions to adopt the smart 
growth measures.  The plan review process in New Jersey is so-called 
“cross-acceptance”, which means an informal process of negotiation among county 
planners, the regional planning commissions and state planning agencies.  In 
addition, New Jersey has a strong state executive system, which gives the governor 
power over state agencies and the implementation of the interim plan depends on the 
governor’s efforts and funding.  Maine’s new Comprehensive Planning and Land 
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Use management Act of 2000 requires the OCP (State Office of Comprehensive 
Planning) and Regional Councils to establish a process reviewing local programs, in 
order to ensure their consistency with state goals.  Rhode Island has a strong growth 
management system through the guidance of its state planning laws - the Rhode 
Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act and the State 
Comprehensive Plan Appeals Board Act.  The two laws require the state planning 
division to review local comprehensive plans.  The local plans must be consistent 
with the State Guide Plan and the goals and policies of the two laws (APA 1999; APA 
2002; Weitz 1999; Degrove 1992).  
The above literature also indicates that the arrangements of planning 
institutional procedures are highly associated with the state’s judicial traditions and 
environmental circumstances.  Beyond the design of the policy, for most of the states 
the successful implementation of smart growth approaches depends on: 1) sustainable 
support by the governor or legislature; 2) substantial funding commitments; 3) the 
proper role of the administering state agency (Degrove 1992).  
I would like to conclude that different planning institutional frameworks 
usually have different consistency requirement and will result in different outcomes 
for smart growth policies in the US.  The past literature shows that without providing 
a certain amount of “consistency” and coordination among jurisdictions and 
reforming outdated comprehensive planning statutes, achieving any level of smart 
growth can be next to impossible.  
4.1.3 Massachusetts’ Role and Defining Incentive Based Smart Growth 
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Before defining Massachusetts’ institutional planning scenario, it is necessary 
to look at its role among other smart growth states.  
According to a 2002 American Planning Association report, Massachusetts is 
among one-third of the states that are actively pursuing their first major statewide 
planning reforms for effective smart growth.  Florida, Oregon, Rhode Island, New 
Jersey, Washington, Georgia are among the one-quarter of the states which are 
implementing moderate to substantial statewide comprehensive planning reforms for 
smart growth.  Maine belongs to the one-fifth of the states that are pursuing 
additional statewide amendments strengthening local planning requirements or 
working to improve regional or local planning reforms already adopted.  
Approximately one-quarter of the states have not made and are not currently pursuing 
any significant statewide planning reforms for smart growth, including Alabama, 
Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, West Virginia and Wyoming etc (APA 2002).  
In Ingram et al. (2009)’s research, Massachusetts ranked low in terms of 
consistency requirements and moderate in local planning effectiveness (see figure 
4.2), where effectiveness is based on the sum of two scores: first, the presence or 
absence of a state mandate for local plans; and second whether formal adoption of the 
local plan is required.  In his growth pattern measurement the Gini coefficient, 
Massachusetts ranked below the middle after the states of Florida, Maryland, 
California, New Jersey and so on, which means it has a more dispersed population 
distribution than those states (see figure 4.3).  
 
-51-
From previous research, I also find not only Massachusetts but also Michigan 
and Connecticut among the states with strong home rules.  However, Massachusetts’ 
local planning effects are considered better than those two and the new smart growth 
measures (e.g. the affordable housing policy in local zoning bylaw etc.) were initially 
enacted (Ingram et al. 2009).  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Consistency and Local Planning Effectiveness (Ingram et al. 2009) 
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Figure 4.3 Spatial Gini Coefficient for 21 Selected States (Ingram et al. 2009) 
 
After comparing various states’ smart growth scenarios and their outcomes the 
growth patterns, I find Massachusetts’ smart growth promotion has a few unique 
characteristics and can be defined as typical incentive based smart growth, in other 
words, the new smart growth measures were enacted after a continuous efforts by 
state legislation and moderate planning reforms already have been made at local level.  
But the state still lacks of mandates due to the Commonwealth culture of strong 
localism (Hamin 2006) and there is no strict consistency requirement among plans 
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and local zoning bylaws either.  The persistent state efforts are considered incentive 
approaches, usually implemented through financial programs and there is no local 
enforcement.  
In summary, Massachusetts’ smart growth scenario provides a unique window 
into the implementation and outcomes of state-based incentives for smart growth 
policies.  The Massachusetts model has been considered an innovative approach to 
smart growth (Ingram et al. 2009).  In the next section I will describe the key 
program - Commonwealth Capital, which forms the core of the incentive approach.   
4.2 Evaluating Commonwealth Capital Program in Massachusetts 
4.2.1 Introduction to Commonwealth Capital Program 
In 2003, former Governor Mitt Romney’s administration established the 
Office for Commonwealth Development to coordinate the major state agencies with a 
role in growth and development, including housing, transportation, energy and the 
environment.  As an incentive for more compact and dense development, the state 
passed legislation in 2004, commonly referred to as 40R-the smart growth zoning 
legislation, which provides additional funding to communities that amend zoning to 
allow higher density housing near transit, town centers, and other smart growth 
locations.  The legislation required that 20 percent of new housing developments in 
those smart growth areas be affordable and cities and towns can get between $10,000 
and $600,000 in state funding, plus an additional $3,000 for every new home created. 
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As of October 2009, twenty-seven of 351 cities and towns had received approval for 
40R district and nine towns/cities had eligible/pending 40R district.  
 Influenced by this significant legislation, many municipalities in 
Massachusetts have made progressive master plans in past years.  For example, in 
2008 the town of Amherst made their first comprehensive master plan since 1969 and 
it has been regarded as a progressive advocate for smart growth.  As a matter of fact, 
Amherst has done many innovative planning projects in the past decades, but most of 
them were focused on specific public interests (Planning Amherst Together 2007).  
For instance, in 2003 they passed an affordable housing plan and in 2001 the 
Landscape Guidelines (revised in 2006) (Planning Department of Amherst 2007).  
Many smart growth zoning techniques were adopted in the local bylaws during those 
years (e. g. the requirement of cluster development, inclusionary zoning, zoning for 
accessory dwelling units, etc. can be found in today’s zoning bylaw). 
In order to funnel various state funds properly, including the grants to buy 
conservation land and to help improve land-use and conservation rules in 2004, Mitt 
Romney’s administration also launched a scoring system designed to measure 
conformity with state policies on development and natural resources management.  
The participating towns and cities were asked to submit a lengthy application, which 
included questions about land use, housing, and preservation policies.  Based on the 
answers, the communities were graded on eight major areas among thirty-one total 
criteria.  This application is part of the Romney administration's Commonwealth 
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Capital policy, designed to funnel grant money to communities deemed best prepared 
to make good use of it2. 
Since then, the Commonwealth Capital score system has been applied every 
fiscal year to “explicitly endorse planning and zoning measures that are consistent 
with the Commonwealth’s Sustainable Development Principles and encourage 
municipalities to implement these measures by using state funding as an incentive.” 
(Executive office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, 2009)  
In 2010, Governor Deval Patrick released the latest version of the 
Commonwealth Capital program, in order to guide the Commonwealth and its 
municipalities in energy consumption, resource conservation, and to provide “homes 
and businesses that shelter the citizens” and bring jobs and revenue that “safeguard 
the future prosperity” (Governor’s letter for Commonwealth Capital FY 2010). 
The FY 2010 Commonwealth Capital program applies to about fourteen grant 
and loan programs offered by the Executive Offices of Administration and Finance, 
Energy and Environmental Affairs (EOEEA), Housing and Economic Development, 
and Transportation and Public Works.  All municipalities seeking funding from 
those programs will need to submit an FY 2010 Commonwealth Capital application in 
order to receive points associated with their smart growth / smart energy consistency.  
The Commonwealth Capital score will account for 30% of the possible points for the 
grant and loan programs.  
According to the Governor’s letter for FY 2010 Commonwealth Capital, the 
program has been tremendously successful: “Municipalities have committed to and 
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implemented hundreds of land use regulatory improvements including new plans and 
zoning” and it “...inspires better communication and cooperation between local boards 
and commissions and providing a specific list of Commonwealth-endorsed measures 
that municipalities can undertake to realize smart growth/smart energy goals…”  
Through September 2010, 313 communities have applied to the 
Commonwealth Capital program, accounting for 90 % of 351 communities in MA.  
4.2.2 Analyzing the Commonwealth Capital System 
The Commonwealth Capital (CC) office of the Office for Commonwealth 
Development (OCD) coordinated the application process in 2003.  Over time, 
administration of the Commonwealth Capital has changed to the department of 
Energy and Environmental Affairs (EOEEA).  The first Commonwealth Capital 
applications were processed with hard copy papers during the fiscal year 2004-2005.  
Since then a municipality’s Chief Elected Official (CEO) or their designee can apply 
to the Commonwealth Capital program electronically through an on-line application 
on the Commonwealth Capital web page.  If exceptional circumstances exist paper 
applications will also be accepted.   
The state’s goal with Commonwealth Capital is to invest in projects that are 
consistent with OCD’s Sustainable Development Principles, which are reflected in 
eight major areas among over 30 criteria in the CC scoring system, and to partner with 
municipalities seeking to advance the Commonwealth's development and resource 
protection interests.  
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Those 10 Sustainable development principles include: 1) Concentrate 
Development and Mix Uses; 2) Advance Equity; 3) Make Efficient Decisions; 4) 
Protect Land and Ecosystems; 5) Use Natural Resources Wisely; 6) Expand Housing 
Opportunities; 7) Provide Transportation Choice; 8) Increase Job and Business 
Opportunities; 9) Promote Clean Energy; 10) Plan Regionally. (See table 4.1 
regarding the details of each year’s CC criteria) 
The main goals and criteria of the Commonwealth Capital program have 
remained the same over the years, however, through the analysis I find minor changes 
(see table 4.1).  In CC05, CC06 and CC08, the criteria weigh housing development 
issues more heavily (e.g. compact development, multi-family dwelling, mixed use 
development etc), which accounts for about 2/3 of the total points.  In CC09 and 
CC10, the system has the same criteria but expands to include sustainable energy 
issues and more points are given to the projects that create job and business 
opportunities.  I will discuss the reasons for those changes in section 4.3.1 through 
the interview data.  
Communities receive points on their Commonwealth Capital application for 
zoning, planning, and other measures already in place at the time of their application 
(Shown as the “Existing” column in the application form) or for measures they 
commit to implement by the end of the year (Shown as the “Commit” column in the 
application form).  In some instances points are cumulative from existing (or 
committed) regulations as well as the existing (or committed) development.  For 
example, a community will receive 11 points if it has “zoning for clustered 
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development” (5 points), and a cluster subdivision using a by-right zoning bylaw (6 
points) (see Criteria 7, 7a, and 7b in CC 2006 application).  That is why I would 
rather to consider the CC scores the proxies of municipal smart growth efforts than 
the policies in the future discussion.  The definitions of CC scores not only include 
local smart growth regulations but also actions.     
In addition, it is possible for a single action to earn points under more than one 
criterion, for example, permitting a cluster subdivision could earn points under the 
“zoning for clustered development” criteria as well as the criteria for water resource 
plans. 
Commencing with CC 063, the CC applicants were able to earn bonus points 
for successfully implementing commitments made in the prior year.  As part of the 
application communities review last year’s commitments, describe progress made, 
and earn a bonus point for each measure implemented.  If a measure has not been 
implemented the communities provide an explanation in the answer box.  In addition, 
communities were allowed to commit to the same criteria in more than one year, as 
long as a legitimate implementation effort is underway.  The maximum score a 
community can receive is 140 points. 
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Table 4.1 The Comparison of Commonwealth Capital Program’s Criteria 
One key assumption of this research is that the Commonwealth Capital (CC) 
scores represent the intensiveness of each town’s smart growth (SG) policies.  To 
test this, we can match the policies on the CC to a typical set of SG policies by 
Commonwealth Capital 
Score Criteria 
CC 
05 
CC 
06 
CC 
08 
CC 
09 
CC
10 
Comments 
1. Plan for & Promote 
Livable Communities 
24 14 10 19 19 All mentioned the Current Master 
Plan and Community Preservation 
Act; the later years gave more points 
to specific action and intention 
2. Zone For & Permit 
Compact Development/ 
Concentrated Development / 
Mixed Use 
42 38 34 26 26 Similar topics in each year, including 
zoning for mixed use, accessory 
units, multifamily dwellings, 
clustered development, TOD etc.  
3. Expand Housing 
Opportunities  
33 33 33 21 21 All mentioned the affordable housing 
issues and municipal housing goals 
4. Developed Sites and 
Buildings  
12 8 8 --  
Encouraging redeveloped sites 
5.Environmental Protection 
and Natural Resource 
Conservation  
24 37 33 29 29 FY 08 included the water policy, 
open space and recreation plan, forest 
protection etc. FY09,10 mentioned 
TDR. All the FY years emphasize on 
town land protection and farm land 
protection   
6. Promote Clean Energy -- -- 6 9 9 FY09,10 more applied criteria 
7. Expand Transportation 
Choice 
-- -- 6 9 9 Different requirement on the starting 
time of action 
8. Make Efficient Decisions 
& Increase Job and Business 
Opportunities  
-- -- -- 11 11 More practice oriented criteria, 
including redevelopment strategy, 
approved priority development sites 
etc 
9. Advance Equity -- -- -- 6 6 Including promoting fair housing and 
environmental equity 
10.Promote Sustainable 
Development via Other 
Actions (up to 10) 7 10 10 10 
 
 
10 Optional points by 2,4,6,8 
11. Bonus  1 1 1 1  
12. Maximum Score   140 140 140 140  
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comparing table 4.1 and table 2.1 (Ye, 2005).  I find that the CC criteria of each 
fiscal year overlap with all the six elements of smart growth policies in table 2.1, for 
instance of the CC 2010’s criteria, items 1, 1a and 1b are related to comprehensive 
planning issues in table 2.1; items in the areas of Zone For & Permit Concentrated 
Development and Mixed Use and Expand Housing Opportunities and Provide 
Transportation Choice cover the housing and transportation issues in Ye (2005)’s 
definitions; items 17-24 include protecting environment and natural resources, which 
is also one of the core elements in the first and second waves for GM/SG campaign 
according to our literature review.  In addition, table 4.1 shows the criteria in CC09 
and CC10 have expanded to promoting clean energy & advancing equity and making 
efficient decisions to increase job and business opportunities.  Those issues were 
discussed by Ingram et al. (2009) in his estimation on the fourth wave of the smart 
growth campaign.  
4.2.3 Testing the Commonwealth Capital Data 
A second basic assumption of this research is that the ranking of each town in 
the smart growth spectrum was relatively stable during past decades.  There are two 
ways variation can enter here.  First, the policies included on the CC score sheet 
changed over time; thus a town could keep the same policies and have different scores.  
Secondly, towns can change their underlying policies in response to the incentives 
built into the CC program.  However, the analysis in this research indicates that both 
hypotheses are not concrete.  I will have a comprehensive discussion on those two 
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hypotheses in the next.   In this section, I will focus on discussing the first 
hypothesis.  
The section 4.2.2 indicates that the first hypothesis can be minor influential, 
because the CC criteria didn’t change too much during past years and the newly added 
items account for less than 35 points of total 140 (see table 4.1).  Another argument 
to disregard the first concern is that I am going to use the average CC scores of the 
past year to represent the towns’ smart growth efforts, which can neutralize these 
minor changes. 
I am going to use the statistical model to discuss the data pattern of CC scores.  
The statistical analysis is also related to the research objective in section 4.3.4:  I will 
consider the statistical pattern of CC data over time a proof to the question whether 
the towns changed their own zoning in response to the stimuli of the CC program. 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Data for Commonwealth Capital Scores, 2005-20104 
 Number of 
applied 
Minimum 
Score 
Maximum 
Score 
Mean Score Std. Dev. 
CC05 191 11 129 63 21.50 
CC06 257 17 128 71 21.43 
CC08 140 30 131 76 20.88 
CC09 177 8 125 69 25.07 
CC10 153 13 130 72 24.84 
 
From table 4.2, I find CC05 has relatively lower means than other years.  The 
mean CCs increases through year 2005 to 2008 and rises up again from CC09 to 
CC10.  It indicates that the average local smart growth efforts increased a little bit in 
the past.  I think the statistical patterns of two waves are because that the CC criteria 
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have been intentionally changed since 2009, in which about 12 points (Promote Clean 
Energy) have been added since 2008, another 17 points added since 2009 (Make 
Efficient Decisions & Increase Job and Business Opportunities and Advance Equity) 
(See table 4.1).    For another instance, Because CC09 and CC10 have the same 
criteria we can conclude the average local smart growth efforts indeed make progress 
from 2009 to 2010.  The statistics also shows that 58 of 99 towns between 2009 and 
2010 have increased their CC scores, accounting for 59%.  
I applied more advanced statistics to examine the above conclusions (see table 
4.3).  A Paired-Samples T test on CC scores from 2005-2010 indicates that CC05 
has a significantly different pattern from the rest of data.  CC06 and CC09, CC09 
and CC10 are also different pairs with higher CC06 and CC10 respectively.  All of 
the pairs are largely correlated and there are no steep changes over time.  The 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test shows that the ranks of towns changed randomly over 
time.  
 
Table 4.3 Paired-Samples T test through CC05-CC10 
  CC05 CC06 CC08 CC09 CC10 
CC05 -- 115/37 70/22 67/41 65/30 
CC06 *** -- 61/59 64/83 56/65 
CC08 ***  -- 40/54 45/43 
CC09 ** **  -- 58/36 
CC10 ***   ** -- 
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001 
Note: on the left corner of the table are significantly different pairs through 
Paired-Samples T test.  On the right corner are the positive ranks and negative ranks of CCs, 
for example, 115 towns increased their ranking and 37 ones decreased from CC05 to CC06.     
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The statistical result confirms two hypotheses:  First, the statistical pattern of 
CC05 is quite different from the rest of data, because the criteria of CC05 are much 
simpler than later years and the applicants were not able to earn bonus points in CC05 
that caused the lower average score.  The different statistical pattern of CC06 and 
CC09 can be explained by the intentioned criteria changes since 2008.  It is very 
interesting to see that CC09 has a significantly different pattern from CC10 and the 
mean CC actually increases from 2009-2010.  
Second, the statistics shows that only 47 towns have consistently applied CC 
program through all the past fiscal years.  The rest of towns are in and out of the 
applying process randomly in the past.  The reasons for the phenomena are not clear.  
It needs further exploration when CC program has been implemented for a longer 
time.  This research assumes that this kind of random statistical pattern can not 
explain the research objectives and it is necessary to merge the qualitative data to 
generate solid conclusions.  
In addition, the statistics also indicates 38 of 351 towns have never applied CC 
program.  I utilize the descriptive information to test whether those omitted 
communities differ significantly than those that will be included in the future 
statistical models.  Table 4.4 shows most of the social-economical factors are not 
significant different except that the omitted communities have relatively smaller 
population/population density and are further away from highway system.  It also 
indicates most of omitted towns are developing towns and rural towns.  Because the 
omitted towns only account for small portion of Massachusetts municipalities, this 
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study assumes the 313 study towns that will be used in future statistical tests have no 
significant bias.  
Table 4.4 Descriptive Data for Omitted Towns 
 
Applied  
CC 
Never Applied 
CC 
Pop2000 19464.27 6757.45 
Pop_Dens 1334.32 688.38 
Med_HH_Inc (K$) 57.71 63.29 
EDU_Bach 34.1% 38.0% 
Ownership 75.5% 78.6% 
Minority 6.4% 4.4% 
Open Space 24.8% 28.3% 
HWY_Dist_M 4.917 7.666 
Social- 
Economical  
Factors 
(Mean) 
DEM 30.5% 23.7% 
Inner Core 16 0 
Regional Urban Centers 41 0 
Maturing Suburbs 56 7 
Developing Towns 138 17 
Town Types 
(Total Number 
of Towns) 
Rural Towns 62 14 
Town With At Least A Planner 191 13 Planning Staff (Total Number 
of Towns) Town Without Any Planner 122 25 
Total Number of Towns 313 38 
 
 
In a sum, the statistical test shows that the average CC scores indeed increased 
a little bit during past years and it indicates the progress of local smart growth efforts 
in Massachusetts.  However, the changes were randomly distributed and there were 
no steep and systematical pattern over the time.   
Therefore, in the future statistical model I plan to utilize the average scores 
from 2005-20105 to represent towns’ smart growth efforts.   
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4.3 Interview Results: Interpreting the Commonwealth Capital Program 
To better understand the CC program, I undertook seven interviews with 
planners in seven towns and several planning experts.  The details of this are 
presented in Chapter 2 (Methods).  Below I summarize the key findings from the 
interviews and provide illustrative quotes for the consensus or majority opinions cited 
here. 
4.3.1 Changing Emphases within the CC Program 
The analysis in section 4.2.2 concludes that CC criteria have minor changes in 
the past and the new items to promote renewable energy and create more jobs were 
more added recently, probably because promoting renewable energy became a 
countrywide policy campaign when Obama’s administration took office in 2009 and 
Massachusetts has been appointed to play a leading role to implement the 
administration’s renewable energy plans.  Also, the financial crisis that happened in 
2008 made it necessary to make more policy efforts to save and create jobs. 
In fact, the interview with the state officials confirmed my estimation.  The 
gentleman at EOEEA told me in 2008: “the establishment of the CC scoring system 
was intended to match the state government policies in each fiscal year.  For 
example, in 2005 and 2006, the criteria of the system would cover more housing 
development issues, and in 2008 and future, it might cover more details on sustainable 
energy, which will related to wind turbine, transportation, vehicle emissions etc… in 
2005 and 2006 two thirds of the criteria are related to housing development, in the 
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future we would apply more weight to transportation which would improve the energy 
efficiency and clean energy, green housing issues …” 
In addition, I also found that the CC criteria were more practical in recent 
years, which intended to award more points according to the towns’ smart growth 
actions.  For example, the town of Sharon increased their score from the average 60 
to 92 in 2009, because two specific 40B projects started recently - the high school 
projects for 79 multiple housing units and another project for 156 rental units (Town 
Planner, Sharon).  This case may explain why several towns have a drastic change of 
CC score over the past years.  
In a sum, the CC program is a politically oriented scoring system.  It is 
influenced by the new policy goals of each elected administration.  The weight of the 
scoring criteria changes a little in most years.  The recent trend is that it serves 
Governor Deval Patrick administration’s policy goals to promote clean energy and 
create more jobs.  Nevertheless, the criteria in CC surveys have covered most of the 
smart growth definitions, and thus it seems that the CC scores are reasonable proxies 
for local smart growth efforts in the Commonwealth.  
4.3.2 Town’s Motivations and Data Reliability  
Commonwealth Capital (CC) program allows a town to examine how it is 
doing by answering the survey questions, which have been considered to fairly reflect 
towns smart growth weakness and strength.  Through the interviews I found that 
although it is a time consuming process to apply to the CC program, all of the town 
planners have made their maxmum effort to complete the survey and most of the 
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awarded credits have been followed by the official documents.  Below is the story 
from Wellesley:  
 
Wellesley went through the CC program in the 2005-2006 fiscal year with 
score 72.  But historically Wellesley has not received the funding ever from 
the State.  It seems to be a low priority community because of its stable 
economy and the wealth of the town.  The planning department put a lot of 
effort to work with the conservation commission, water department and so on 
to answer all of these criteria but they just never get funds from the state.  
That is why they don’t apply for CC program any more.  
 
In addition, sometimes there is a lag between when the CC application 
submitted to the town and when planning department received it: the 
application was sent to the board of selectmen and was not sent directly to the 
planning department at the beginning. After the board hold it for three months, 
they said : “ oh, it should be sent to planning department”.  Planning staff 
even don’t find time to do this on top of their daily activities (Town Planner, 
2009).  (I assume this story happened in 2005 when the hardcopy survey 
were initialized) 
 
As the matter of fact, the same situation happened in Bolton and Sharon.  
Both of the town planners told me how tedious and time consuming to fill out the 
Commonwealth Capital forms and how difficult it is to coordinate with the other 
departments to complete the docomentation.  Therefore, I would conclude that CC 
scores are reliable as the proxies of towns’efforts on smart growth due to town 
planners’ hard work. 
In addition, a reflection by a regional planning expert on the CC scores in 
Lincoln and Hingham can give us another view on the reliability of the data.  The 
gentleman is a long-term resident of Lincoln and runs one of the biggest real estate 
companies in Hingham.  Hingham ranked 28 of 313 valid CC score towns with 
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average score of 95, while Lincoln ranked 79 with average score of 80.  Lincoln and 
Hingham have population of 8,050 and 19,882 respectively and have been categorized 
as maturing suburbs in MAPC’s typology studies.  Below are the quotes from him: 
 
“I think Lincoln is much smarter than Hingham. Hingham actually doesn’t 
care about smart growth….Hingham happened to be short of water and they 
have to have water plan…”  “Hingham is 300 years old community, the 
whole center of town is mixed used and the retail section has house right 
above it.  It automatically wins those credits.  Lincoln is a residential 
community.  There is only small commercial area in Lincoln right around the 
transit station.  So the rest of town were all zoned as single family residential 
whereas Hingham was so diverse to start with and stay in that way.” “Lincoln 
has a train station and Hingham didn’t want train station.  Hingham 
historically had a water shuttle, so they got the point...”  
 
“Lincoln is the only small rich suburban town that had achieved the 40B 
threshold to create affordable housing in 2000.  We created two projects to 
create affordable housing (one in 1999, the other in 1970s) and we did our 
own affordable housing projects by ourselves.  Hingham gains the points 
because the affordable housing developer came in and it is not because their 
policy was good…The check box in the criteria don’t necessary reflect the 
towns’ culture and desire on the smart growth.  Hingham doesn’t have strong 
smart growth culture.  It can be hard to get these points if the criteria do not 
match the right place in the town.” “…Even the town has done many things to 
promote smart growth, some of those are showed in CC criteria and some of 
them not.  For example, Lincoln already put 240 units of affordable housing, 
probably more than all the suburban communities combined in 1999.  So we 
don’t get any credits for those points (Because CC program happened after 
2003).  But we in fact invested the affordable units, even though it is hard to 
be sold…Lincoln only have 60% homeownership is because we have those 
two early affordable projects- rental projects.  Those rental projects average 
out Lincoln’s median household income.  We are actually as rich town as 
Weston…” 
In conclusion, the gentleman argued “I think CC is a good proxy for smart 
growth communities, but there should be a footnote saying it still has limitations 
because it could have achievement based on the historic land patterns or luck.  And it 
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also may cut out some very good smart growth things, for example, Lincoln and 
Weston spent their tax money to built affordable housing in the time that was before 
the Commonwealth Capital requirement.”  
As more evidence to prove the reliability of the data, the gentleman at EOEEA 
told me that all the CC applications are processed through the internet and reviewed 
by him and his department.  The department also requires the municipalities to 
submit the related evidence to support their applications and he thought the CC scores 
were reliable. 
Through the analysis of these above cases, we conclude that Commonwealth 
Capital actually reflects the town’s smart growth effort and land development patterns 
very well: the higher score town - Hingham indeed has more mixed use land and more 
smart growth development pattern, although the score may not cover all of the smart 
growth definitions and reflect all the efforts that towns demonstrated.  In addition, I 
conclude that the main motivation for town to apply for CC program is for state funds.   
4.3.3 Rural Criteria vs Urban Criteria 
Some planners complained that the CC criteria were unfair to rural 
communities.   For instance, the planner from Ashby said the following: “Our town 
has no public transportation, no septic system, no public housing project, housing 
prices are very low. We go apply for CC or open space funding and end up with very 
low score.  Ashby has a lot of natural resources to protect…especially with the 
drinking water… there is no protection on that…Ashby has 3200 people…which 
makes smart growth very difficult to implement…I don’t think the ranking is 
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reasonable.  Criteria are mostly toward city and large towns.  When looking at 
giving money for protecting open space, I don’t think the criteria are fair…”  
When asking if Commonwealth Capital Scores reflect the municipality’s 
policy efforts to promote smart growth, the town planner at Bolton answered: “Yes in 
some ways.  However, because we are a small town with large lot zoning and no 
public water or sewer it is difficult to have zoning that allows for multi-families. This 
can limit the score attainable for Bolton.”  On the contrary, she also thinks “I am 
pleased with the ranking.  I am doing a lot of things. We have housing plans, master 
plan, mixed.  Because we did the study by UMASS on sustainable development, we 
are able to commit to those things.  We will have the “Commit” points.  When 
looking at housing, the town is pretty progressive in trying to have affordable housing. 
We do have inclusionary bylaw in place.  So if the subdivision comes in and it is got 
more than eight units, one of them has to be affordable…”  
Another good example of the towns talking about advantage of the rural/urban 
criteria in CC system is from Northampton.  It is a type of regional urban center and 
ranks first of 313 valid CC score towns with average score of 127.  When I asked the 
town planner why their town had such a high ranking, he had the following answers: 
“Three things account: first, we are really sustainable community. We are certainly 
top 10% of the state in terms of what we did.  Second, we have good planning staffs 
to do a better application… Third, we can get the points that only city areas can get 
like affordable housing.  We also get the points that only rural areas can get like 
having agriculture commission right to farm bylaw… Because we are both a 
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urban/suburban and rural community…the more diversity the community is, 
the more chances to get the CC points.”  
While fairness will always be in the eye of the beholder, we can put some 
numbers to the different criteria as to whether they tend to be easier to achieve in 
urban or rural situations.   
Table 4.5 Rural Criteria Vs Urban Criteria 
 CC Criteria CC05 CC06 CC08 CC09/ 
CC10 
Average 
% 
40R District or TOD, Mixed-Use 
Development 
7 10 8 8 
Zoing allowing by-right 
multifamily dwellings 
7 7 7 6 
New units using SG techniques 
(e.g affordable housing)  
20 6 9 4 
Total 34 23 24 18 
Urban 
Percentage 24.3% 16.4% 17.1% 12.9% 
 
 
 
17.6% 
15% or more of town area 
protected 
5 5 5 9 
Existence of Agriculture 
Commission 
4 3 3 3 
Approved Stweardship plan for 
municipal forest 
-- 2 2 3 
Affirming right to Farm 4 4 3 3 
Zoing for Agricultural/Foresty 
preservation 
4 3 3  
Total 16 17 16 18 
Rural  
Percentage 11.4% 12.1% 11.4% 12.9% 
 
 
 
 
 
12.0% 
 
From table 4.5 we can see that the percentage of the criteria with urban 
characteristics is slightly higher than rural ones - 17.6% and 12%.  However, 
because most of the urban criteria also have subdivision items to measure towns’ 
detailed actions, it is very possible that rural communities also gain points in the 
urban criteria.  The urban communities can also gain points in the criteria with rural 
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characteristics.  For example, in the CC06 application form, the item 4 -“zoning for 
mixed used in an applicable location”, which has been categorized as a typical urban 
criteria, was divided into two sub-items 4a and 4b: “If mixed-use zoning is a DHCD 
approved 40R District or for Transit Oriented Development” and “Building permit 
issued for a mixed-use development since July 1, 2003”.  Bolton, as a small 
suburban town with very much more rural characteristics also gained the urban-points 
by checking the “commit” box (item 4a). 
In addition, both rural and urban criteria only account for less than 30% of 
total CC scores in each year, which doesn’t polarize the system too much.   
Therefore, we conclude there is no significant bias in the CC criteria in terms of rural 
or urban characteristics.  The CC program is a relatively fair scoring system.   
In the Fiscal Year 2006 Commonwealth Capital Application Guidance we 
found a quote by the program designer: “Some criteria, such as the establishment of 
an agricultural commission, are not feasible in every community.  The application 
has been crafted in a way that balances scoring opportunities across urban, suburban, 
and rural communities.  As a result, applicant communities are not expected to earn 
all available Commonwealth Capital points.  It is also important to remember that 
scores are relative...”   
4.3.4 Not Obvious for Stimuli Purpose 
In the interview with the official at EOEEA I was told that one of the purposes 
of the CC program is to incentivize municipalities to adopt more smart growth 
policies, however, that outcome is not obvious through the qualitative analysis. 
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Some planners argue it doesn’t create competion at all, because they thought 
state funds were granted according to tradition and necessity and the improvement of 
the CC score did not necessarily bring in more funding in most of the towns.  For 
instance, when being asked whether CC program created competition among 
municipalites, the town planner in Sharon answered: “ No. I think each town pursues 
the portions of the CC that are attractive to them or that suit their needs and 
requirements.”  The town planner in Northampton said: “I don’t know if it really 
creates competition.  When looking at what we do each year, we don’t adopt policies 
based on the CC score… Only a minority of state grant dollars are affected by CC 
scores…but the biggest source of money we got from state is not affected by the 
CC program.”  He mentioned that the biggest funds are from education, 
transportation and renewable energy projects and influenced by other legislation in 
Massachusetts.  
The town planner in Wellesley gave me similar answers: the competition 
happens when “the municipalities desired those funds, for example, small 
communities, rural communities”.  The application story of the CC program at 
Wellesley (see section 4.3.2) also indicated the town did not prioritize winning state 
funds no matter the CC score it could had. 
An interesting view is that some planners even think towns with lower scores 
have better chance to win state funds.  The planner in Bolton told me that she and 
her former boss in another town questioned the real influence of CC scores to 
determine the state funds.  She asked me: “Is it true that some towns having lower 
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scores are better to have CC grant? Because you need a lot work, you need a grant…”.  
In addtion, in the questionnaie she wrote: “I don’t think the application forces towns 
to compete with each other, however, I do think the application allows a town to 
reflect on how it is doing by answering the questions.  For example, when 
completing the current application I was quite astonished on how well the town of 
Bolton has done in the energy and sustainable question sections and mixed zoning.  I 
think the application allows a town to see where they are weak and how they can 
make improvements.”  
Comparing the interview data with statistical outcomes in section 4.2.3, where 
the changing pattern of CC05-CC10 data over the time has been discussed, I conclude 
the local smart growth efforts have made gradual progress during past years, however, 
it is not obvious that towns have changed their own zoning in response to the stimuli 
of the CC program. 
As a summary of the whole evaluation of the Commonwealth Capital program, 
I think the scoring system has indeed achieved the goal of measuring towns’ smart 
growth efforts with its politically oriented criteria and the data are reliable.  However, 
the goal of incentivizing municipalities to promote smart growth policies is not very 
successful.  As Mr Mitchell said in 2005 on Boston Global (Boston Global 2005), 
“The score only means something in context…On some grant proposals, a low score 
might back up the town’s claim that it needs help…”  
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2 The story of the origins of the Commonwealth Capital Program and 
legislation 40R are mainly from three sources: First, the book of Smart Growth 
Policies: An Evaluation of Programs and Outcomes, by Ingram et al (2009) at page 7.  
Second, the report of “Smart growth” Questionnaire Shaping State Grant Allocations 
from the Boston Globe on Feb 27th, 2005, by Robert Knox.  Third, the slides from 
the Department of Housing and Economic Development’s website, named Overview 
of M.G.L Chapter 40R.  
3 Commonwealth Capital Program usually starts at July and ends one year 
later.  In this research, I use the ending year to indicate the specific period of the CC 
program, for example, CC06 means the program starts on July 1, 2005 and ends on 
June 30, 2006.    
4 The histogram of each year’s CC score is demonstrated in the below picture. 
Through observation, we conclude every fiscal year’s CC scores fits the bell-shaped 
normal distribution.  
5 The final version of CC scores in this research has been obtained in 
September 2010, which includes completed CC05, CC06, CC08, CC09 and CC10.  
In this research, the term “average CC score” or “CC scores” equal to the average CC 
scores through the year 2005-2010, unless there is a specific footnote.  
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CHAPTER 5  
THE INFLUENCE OF TOWNS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed Massachusetts’ institutional planning 
scenario and the reliability of the Commonwealth Capital program (CC).  In this 
chapter, I explore the question: what factors are associated with the local smart 
growth efforts in Massachusetts?  The political scenario in Massachusetts provides 
us with an assumption for the examination: “Massachusetts residents have strong 
independence in political decision making and local control is legislatively 
organized as home rule (Geigis et al., 2007).”  It allows me to nail down the sample 
scale to the municipal levels and consider each municipality relatively independently.  
Hence, I can apply the municipal demographic information in various models.  
However, literally independent doesn’t necessarily mean statistically independent.  
That is why I need to conduct the tests for spatial dependency in the tests as well.   
Previous studies indicate that a municipality’s adoption of smart growth 
policies is highly associated with its wealth, education status, rural characteristics, 
and proxity to large cities (Brody 2006; Edwards 2007; Hamin 2006; Landis1986, 
1992, 2006).   But there is relatively little quantitative research to give systematic 
insight on those issues in a statewide area.  I am going to apply the CC data to 
examine the situation in this chapter.  
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5.2 Model Design and Data Sources 
The research question in this chapter can be interpreted as:  
CC = F (X )                (4) 
Where CC is the dependable variable and represents the policy efforts of 
individual municipalities.  X is a vector of independent variables representing 
possible explanatory factors or factors associated with policy efforts.  The possible 
explanatory factors and their inter-relationships can be demonstrated by figure 5.1. 
Besides the above demographic factors I mentioned, I am also going to apply the 
available categorical data to provide different views for the examinations.  Those 
categorical data include town types, political factors and planners’ efforts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Diagram for Explanatory Factors 
 
As described in the chapter on methods, I estimate most numerical data using 
an OLS (Ordinary Least Square) multivariate regression model.  To accommodate 
CC 
Town 
Demographics 
Transportation 
Open Space 
Political Factors 
(Categorical Data) 
Planners’ Efforts 
(Categorical Data) 
Town Types 
(Categorical Data) 
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possible spatial autocorrelation among nearby municipalities, I also re-estimate 
those variables using a spatial regression model.  The independent samples T test 
and One-Way ANOVA6 test will be utilized to test the X as categorical data.    
The dependent variable is measured as each municipality’s average CC score 
between the years 2005 -2010 to reflect the level of each town’s smart growth 
efforts.  As discussed in Chapter three municipal CC scores are relatively stable 
over the years, thus validating the use of a multi-year average.   
The adoption of smart growth policies are complicated issues with numerous 
explanatory factors and influences.  Therefore, I assembled an extensive list of 
independent variables gathered from various data sources, including both numerical 
and categorical measures.   Most independent variables in the X vector come from 
the US Decennial Census of Population 2000.  The earliest data are Average 
Household Income in 1999 and all the rest of the variables are within the past ten 
years, from 1999-2009.   As found with the dependent variable, the demographic 
and geographic status of each town has changed little over the past ten years allow 
us to introduce these measures as cross-sectional data. 
In addition, I estimate that the categorical factors like form of government 
(council, town meeting, etc.), type of town (suburban, developing, etc.) etc may 
have been some overlap (e.g. more urban centers would be cities government).  I 
will apply the correlation examinations and have specific discussions on these 
collinear problems.  
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5.3 The Tests 
In this section, I empirically test a number of different hypotheses of the 
possible influences of socio-economic and place characteristics on the adoption of 
municipal smart growth policies.  I first discuss the independent variables and their 
expected relationship with the CC measure before presenting the model results.  
This is followed by a comparison of the empirical results with the hypothesized 
relationships. 
5.3.1 Test 1: The Regular OLS Multivariate Regression Model 
The OLS multiple regression model has been widely applied in social 
science.  This method is employed to account for (or predict) the variance in an 
interval-measured dependent variable, based on linear combinations of interval, 
dichotomous, or dummy independent variables.  Multivariate regression can 
establish that a set of independent variables explains a proportion of the variance in 
a dependent variable at a significant level and can establish the relative predictive 
importance of the independent variables by comparing beta weights (Gerstman, 
2008). .  
Table 5.1 demonstrates related independent variables and expected results 
for all the variables obtained at the town scale.  Two questions will be explored in 
this test.  The first OLS multivariate regression model is going to employ 
explanatory variables through variable 1 to 9 in table 5.1.  A dummy variable 
delineating communities in western and eastern Massachusetts is included in the 
second model (Figure 5.2).  The factors associated with local smart growth policies 
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in those two regions might be different because the likely dominating influence of 
the Boston metropolitan center in the east.   
Table 5.1 Social-Economical Factors as Independent Variables  
 
No 
Independent  
Variables Variable Definitions 
Expected 
Effect Data Source 
1 Pop2000 Total population in 2000 + 
US Census 
2000 
2 Pop_Dens 
Population density per square mile of 
land area in 2000 + 
US Census 
2000 
3 Med_HH_Inc 
Median Households Income in 1999   
($ 1000) - 
US Census 
2000 
4 EDU_Bach 
Population 25 years and over, percent 
with bachelor's degree or higher  + 
US Census 
2000 
5 Ownership 
Percent of owners in occupied housing 
unit + 
US Census 
2000 
6 Minority Percent of minorities in total population - 
US Census 
2000 
7 Open Space 
Percent of land and water area as 
protected and recreational open space + MASSGIS 
8 HWY_Dist_M 
The distance from town's geographic 
centroid to closest highway exit (Miles) - MASSGIS 
9 DEM Percent of registered voters as Democrats + Town Profile 
10 West_East 
Dummy variables for towns located in 
western/eastern MA: West=0 East =1 + 
Revised from 
Massachusetts 
Dept Of Public 
Health 
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Figure 5.2 Map for Eastern and Western Massachusetts
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Table 5.2 shows the descriptive information of dependent variable and eight 
independent variables.  As hypothesized, location along the west-east divide of the 
state also makes a significant difference in perception of the need for smart growth 
policies.  The statistic on the west-east dummy variable is significant and positive, 
with mean CC scores of 57 for the west and 71 for the East.   
Table 5.2 Descriptive Data for Social-Economical Variables and CC Scores 
 Mean Std. Dev. N 
CC05-CC10 66 21.51 313 
Pop2000 19464 39239.49 313 
EDU_Bach 34.1% 0.16 313 
Minority 6.4% 0.08 313 
Ownership 75.5% 0.15 313 
Pop_Dens 1334 2464.98 313 
Open Space 24.8% 0.12 313 
HWY_Dist_M 4.9 5.17 313 
Med_HH_Inc 57.71 17.75 313 
DEM 30.5% 0.12 313 
 
Table 5.3 Regression Model for Social-Economical Variables 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 N =313   N = 313   
 F = 15.124  p(F)= 0.000    F = 15.996  p(F)= 0.000   
 R = 0.557  R Square = 0.310  R = 0.588  R Square = 0.346 
Variables Coefficient t Pr  Coefficient t Pr 
Constant 108.255 9.91   103.588 9.67  
Pop2000 0.000 1.67   0.000 1.59  
EDU_Bach 33.916 2.91 **  42.358 3.67 *** 
Minority 13.025 0.58   7.382 0.34  
Ownership -70.076 -5.57 ***  -61.688 -4.96 *** 
Pop_Dens -0.002 -3.00 **  -0.002 -3.58 *** 
OpenSpace 6.150 0.61   5.406 0.55  
HWY_Dist_M -0.943 -3.91 ***  -0.733 -3.05 ** 
Med_HH_Inc -0.031 -0.26   -0.238 -1.87  
DEM 14.381 1.15   16.595 1.35  
West_East     10.902 4.09 *** 
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001 
Dependent Variable: CC05-CC10 
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Table 5.3 presents the results from our simple OLS models, with and without 
the West-East dummy variable.  From R square value , we can see that the 
inclusion of the West-East dummy variable improves the overall model fit, and is 
statistically significant.  Housing ownership is the most significant explanatory 
variable in both models.  Its negative coefficient indicates that towns with a higher 
percentage of owners in occupied housing units (and conversely a lower percent of 
renters) tend to have a lower CC scores, even after controlling for the possible 
confounding influence of urbanization.  This is the most critical finding in the 
research and represents the theoretical rationale for smart growth policies as 
explained by Fischel’s (2001) “Homevoter Hypothesis”7.  This conclusion gives us 
a view on the conflicting nature of smart growth campaigns.  On one hand, the 
campaign takes a lot of effort to advocate affordable housing, multiple housing units, 
and mixed use land that encourages higher density development and will possibly 
benefit more renters.  On the other hand, the local policies are largely determined 
by homeowners, who usually are “guided by their concern for the value of their 
homes…are acutely aware that local amenities, public services, and taxes affect the 
largest asset they own” (Fischel 2001)8 making them unwilling to alter the status 
quo.  The inclusion of the East-West dummy variable does not change the 
significant level of the factor - homeownership.  
Education level is also highly significant in both models: The percentage of 
residents with bachelor or higher degree, is positively associated with the levels of 
smart growth policies.  The inclusion of the West-East dummy variable seems to 
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strengthen the significance and magnitude of educational attainment, which tends to 
be considerably higher in the east.  The coefficients on the share of the population 
with bachelor’s degrees or higher is notably higher and now significant at a 98% 
threshold.  These findings are similar outcomes as Brody (2006)’s studies on 
SRPPs: The education levels are highly associated with the adoptions of sprawl 
reduction policies in a jurisdiction area.  
Towns’ distance from the interstate highway system - HWY_Dist_M, is a 
third influential factor.  The association between access to the highway system and 
smart growth policies in Massachusetts is slightly negative.  While this matches 
Degrove’s (1992) concept of “concurrency” in Florida, which requires that 
development can occur only where there are adequate infrastructure and other public 
facilities.  Prior research also suggests that when highway infrastructure reaches an 
area, residents will be more to adopt smart growth policies to promote higher 
compact development forms in response to growth pressures.  When we control for 
the West-East orientation, the negative coefficient estimate for highways has moves 
closer to zero but remains statistically significance at a 95% threshold.   
Table 5.3 also indicates that population density is the fourth influential factor 
that associates with local smart growth efforts in the first model and the inclusion of 
the West-East dummy variable seems to increase its significant level.  The 
direction of the association is slightly negative, defying the typical view that the 
higher density towns should have more smart growth efforts.  This outcome might 
be explained by that many rural town or regional urban center had unusual higher 
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CC scores than the rest of the town because of the large conservation areas and 
diverse land bases.  And the population density in those towns is not very high at 
all comparing with inner core towns.  This could also be due to possible multi- 
collinearity problems, because that population density has the highest possibility to 
have correlate with the other independent variables.      
The variables that were not significant include democratic orientation factors, 
median household income, open space, total population and percentage of minority.  
I guess some of those variables might be magnitude when the test samples are 
narrowed down and I will discuss these in the later sections.  
 
5.3.2 Test 2: The Spatial Regression Model 
In this research I use Anselin’s methods to analyze and quantify spatial 
effects (Anselin 1995, 2003, 2005).  Two tests9 are applied for diagnostics of 
spatial dependence: Moran’s I and the Lagrange Multiplier test.  Moran’s I is the 
standard method for detecting global autocorrelation and the Legrange multiplier 
tests are used to help detect whether a spatial error or spatial lag specification is 
more appropriate. 
Table 5.4 shows: Moran’s I test on the OLS yields a significant and positive 
result of 0.2089 (z = 5.9414 and p < 0.0000000), which shows a significant and 
positive spatial relationship.  Lagrange Multiplier tests on the OLS show that LM 
(lag) and LM (error) are both significant and positive values of 21.2436 (p < 
0.0000040) and 29.3844 (p < 0.0000001) respectively.  However, only Robust LM 
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(error) are significant with p value far more than 0.05.  It indicates the hypothesis 
can be fit by spatial error model.  
 
Table 5.4 Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence 
 
 
Therefore, I use the spatial error model with the independent variables 1-9 in 
table 5.1 and dependent variable of average CC scores from year 2005-2010 to 
examine the spatial dependence hypothesis.  Table 5.5 displays OLS and spatially 
correlated error model estimates.  A coefficient on the spatially correlated errors 
(LAMBDA) is added in the second model as an additional indicator.  It has a 
positive effect and is highly significant.  The general model fit improved as 
indicated in higher values of R square and log likelihood in spatial error model.   
It is interesting to see that the factors of distance to highway system and 
population density disappear when spatial dependences are considered.  It indicates 
that the two factors have spatial correlation and allowing error terms to be spatially 
correlated makes their effects go away.  Towns’ political preferences become 
influential factor in spatial error model, which demonstrates that the spatial pattern 
of registered Democrats will affect the local smart growth efforts and their 
influences are positive.   
Test MI/DF z-value Probability 
Moran’I (error) 0.208941 5.9414474 0.0000000 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 21.2435797 0.0000040  
Robust LM (lag) 1 0.3675493 0.5443431 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 29.3844304 0.0000001  
Robust LM (error) 1 8.5084001 0.0035351  
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Table 5.5 OLS Multivariate Regression Model and Spatial Error Model 
 OLS Multivariate Regression  Spatial Error Regression 
 N =313   N = 313   
 Log likelihood = -1346.06  Log likelihood = -1322.80 
 R Square = 0.310  R Square = 0.416 
Variables Coefficient t Pr  Coefficient z Pr 
Constant 108.255 9.91   94.006 7.87    
Pop2000 0.000 1.67   0.000 1.66  
EDU_Bach 33.916 2.91 **  38.05 2.71 ** 
Minority 13.025 0.58   21.257 0.98  
Ownership -70.076 -5.57 ***  -60.745 -5.12 *** 
Pop_Dens -0.002 -3.00 **  -0.002 -1.57  
OpenSpace 6.150 0.61   -5.454 -0.50  
HWY_Dist_M -0.943 -3.91 ***  0.164 0.41  
Med_HH_Inc -0.031 -0.26 **  -0.102 -0.65  
DEM 14.381 1.15   30.539 2.28 * 
LAMBDA   ***  0.834 28.15 *** 
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001 
Dependent Variable: CC05-CC10 
I also test the hypothesis that whether the inclusion of the East-West dummy 
reduces the amount of spatial dependence.   Moran’s I and the Lagrange Multiplier 
tests also show the spatial error model can be used when dummy variable is included. 
The result indicates there are no significant changes comparing with the original 
tests in table 5.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -89-
Table 5.6 OLS Multivariate Regression Model and Spatial Error Model 
(Dummy Variable included) 
 OLS Multivariate Regression  Spatial Error Regression 
 N =313   N = 313   
 Log likelihood = -1337.61  Log likelihood = -1320.72 
 R Square = 0.346  R Square =  
Variables Coefficient t Pr  Coefficient z Pr 
Constant 103.588 9.67   88.667 7.32  
Pop2000 0.000 1.59   0.000 1.68  
EDU_Bach 42.358 3.67 ***  38.620 2.79 ** 
Minority 7.382 0.34   20.839 0.97  
Ownership -61.688 -4.96 ***  -58.934 -4.94 ***
Pop_Dens -0.002 -3.58 ***  -58.934 -1.79  
OpenSpace 5.406 0.55   -5.103 -0.47  
HWY_Dist_M -0.733 -3.05   0.074 0.20  
Med_HH_Inc -0.238 -1.87   -0.123 -0.79  
DEM 16.595 1.35   30.479 2.30 * 
West_East 10.902 4.09   8.813 1.35  
LAMBDA     0.760 20.06  
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001 
Dependent Variable: CC05-CC10 
 
5.3.3 Test 3: From the View of Different Town Types  
The next set of models introduces a more refined municipal typology into the 
multivariate regression analysis to answer additional questions about the factors that 
are associated with towns’ SG efforts.  In 2008, the Metropolitan Area Planning 
Council (MAPC) created a classification system of Massachusetts municipalities in 
identifying five basic community types (Table 5.7 and Figure 5.3).  The criteria 
used to define community types include land use and housing patterns, recent 
growth trends, and projected development patterns (MAPC, 2008).   
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Table 5.7 Descriptive Data for CC Scores in Five Types of Towns 
 Total 
N 
Valid 
N 
Mean 
CC05_10 
Min 
CC05_10 
Max 
CC05_10 
Std. 
Dev. 
Inner Core 16 16 77 36 110 18.82
Regional Urban 
Centers 
41 41 84 46 127 18.09
Maturing 
Suburbs 
63 56 72 33 113 16.98
Developing Towns 155 138 65 17 112 18.69
Rural Towns 76 62 45 11 79 17.83
Table 5.7 shows that the regional urban centers have the highest mean CC 
scores and the rural towns have the lowest mean CC scores.  The statistical pattern 
shows that the CC scores decline with the towns’ development levels from regional 
urban center to rural towns.   The high average scores of regional urban centers 
can be explained by the diversity of those towns, which, like Northampton and 
Amherst, usually include both rural/urban and suburban characteristics and can 
accumulate a lot of points in different CC criteria. 
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Figure 5.3 Map for Town Types 
 -92-
Table 5.8 shows the influence of community types (added as a series of 
dummy variables) to our multivariate OLS model.  The Developing Towns dummy 
variable is automatically excluded by the software to avoid perfect co-linearity in the 
independent variables.  I also removed the east-west dummy variable to avoid 
problems associated with multi-colinearity.   
 
Table 5.8 Regression Model with Different Type of Towns 
 Model 3 
 N =313  
 F = 16.729  p(F)= 0.000   
 R = 0.649  R Square = 0.421 
Variables Coefficient t Pr 
Constant 105.552 9.91  
Pop2000 0.000 1.78  
EDU_Bach 55.081 4.87 *** 
Minority -4.291 -0.19  
Ownership -37.666 -2.85 ** 
Pop_Dens 0.000 -0.27  
OpenSpace 6.843 0.72  
HWY_Dist_M -0.348 -1.47  
Med_HH_Inc -0.406 -3.33 *** 
DEM -14.423 -1.16  
Inner Core -6.237 -0.73  
Regional Urban Centers 7.380 1.82  
Maturing Suburbs 4.289 1.45  
Rural Towns -21.898 -6.71 *** 
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001 
Dependent Variable: CC05-CC10 
 
The inclusion of the town type dummy variables has significant effects on 
the magnitude and significance of the coefficient estimates for the factors of 
homeownership, education, and median household income.  The overall model fit 
has been largely improved compared with model 1 and 2 in table 5.3.  The test 
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outcomes indicate that when towns are segmented according to their characteristics, 
the wealth and general education levels of towns are significantly associated with 
local smart growth efforts.    
Table 5.9 Regression Model in Different Type of Towns 
  
Inner Core 
 
Regional 
Urban 
Centers 
 
Maturing 
Suburbs 
 
Developing Towns 
 
Rural Towns
N 16 41 56 138 62 
R2 Model Failed 0.480 0.525 0.353 0.421 
  β Pr Β Pr β Pr β Pr β Pr 
Pop2000 0.000    0.000 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.010 **
EDU_Bach 6.176    84.275 * 101.788 *** 19.338  21.554  
Minority 155.113    -17.485 12.230  -23.953  283.582  
Ownership 38.797    -35.279 -26.432  -77.396 ** -14.816  
Pop_Dens 0.005    0.000 -0.007 * -0.008  -0.017  
OpenSpace 235.686    38.902 -81.304 ** 45.995 ** -22.942  
HWY_Dist_M 4.657    -0.603 1.331  0.163  -1.010 *
Med_HH_Inc 1.282    -0.764 -0.734 ** 0.025  -0.627  
DEM 78.946   -72.501 * -39.046  -6.036  -1.795  
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = P<0.001 
Dependent Variable: CC05-CC10 
Table 5.9 shows the multivariate regression tests within each type of towns, 
because I think the combined model does not tell how the different factors vary 
across town types, only within.  From the tests I found that only the regression 
model failed in inner core towns due to the small sample size.  It also shows towns’ 
education level and political preference might be associated with smart growth 
efforts in regional urban center.  But the limited samples (41) to do OLS 
multivariate regression test in this type of towns could result in inaccurate statistics. 
The table 5.9 indicates that the town size (population) is significantly 
associated with smart growth efforts in maturing suburbs, developing towns and 
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rural towns.  The wealth of a town - the median household income and education 
level are highly associated with CC scores in maturing suburbs, which are mainly 
located in suburban area of Boston and Cape Code (see figure 5.3).   
For developing towns, home ownership is negatively associated with CC 
scores while open space is positively associated.  This may explain why a town like 
Bolton, which is classified as “developing” has a middle ranking in the CC spectrum.  
It is a modestly small, but wealthy town with a high percentage of home ownership.   
Through table 5.9, I also find that open space has a significant influence in 
maturing suburbs, developing towns.  It shows the direction of association changes 
in that type of town. 
 
5.3.4 Test 4: From the View of Political Factors 
5.3.4.1 The Hypotheses 
Many of the interviewees argue that ideological identification and political 
affiliation are highly influential determinants of a town’s adoption of smart growth 
policies.  The specific form of municipal government and representation may also 
be influential.  The state’s tradition of municipal independence also relates to local 
traditions of direct participatory democracy, which can be explained by below 
paragraphs.  The governance of Massachusetts communities can be classified into 
one of three basic types (See table 5.10 Government Type 1,2, 3).   
 
According to one source, “The reasons for those three government forms are 
historic.   All towns started with board of selected men to run the town, as 
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the town gets bigger or more complex, many of them change the charging of 
town to town manager (further to more advanced level to city council and 
city mayor).  The difference between town managers and the rest is town 
manager tends to have very strong power and appoint things, so town 
manager’s attitude to smart growth is influential.”  
 
Geigis et al. (2007) made a summary about Massachusetts’ political 
traditions: “Ever since the colonists dumped tea into the Boston Harbor to 
protest taxation without representation, Massachusetts residents have boasted 
a strong independence in political decision making.  This independence is 
reflected in Massachusetts’ 351 separate and distinct cities and towns each 
governed by a city council or by a town meeting in which residents 
collectively make community decisions by a majority vote.   The politics of 
local control is legislatively organized in Massachusetts and many other 
states as home rule, in which local communities can do pretty much what 
they want as long as it is not in conflict with existing state regulations.”  
 
Table 5.10 Categorical Variables for the Test on Political Factors 
Categorical 
Variables 
Variable Definitions No.  
Expected 
Effect 
Board of Selectmen Town Manager Gov_Town 
Manager (Type 1) Town Council Town Manager 
41 
 
Board of Selectmen Executive Secretary 
Board of Selectmen Town Adminitrator 
Board of Selectmen Administrative Assistant 
Board of Selectmen Executive Administrator 
Board of Selectmen Executive Assistant 
Board of Selectmen Town Coordinator 
Board of Selectmen Administrative Coordinator 
Gov_Executive 
Secretary     
(Type 2) 
Board of Selectmen Chief Administrative Officer 
215 
 
City Council  Mayor Gov_City Council 
(Type 3) City Council  City Manager 
43 
 
Meeting (1) Open Town Meeting 259 
Meeting (2) Representative Town Meeting 44 
DEM Town (1) More registered democrats than registered republicans  302 
GOP Town (0) More registered republicans than registered democrats  48 
Significant 
Difference 
 
 
 
 
Source: Town Profiles at www.mass.gov 
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I apply an independent sample T test (2 groups of variables) and ANOVA 
test (3 and more groups of variable) to examine three questions: 1) Do different 
forms of town government make a difference in terms of SG efforts in 
Massachusetts? 2) Do different types of town meetings make a difference in terms 
of SG efforts in Massachusetts? 3) Are predominantly Democrat communities likely 
to be more favorable to smart growth efforts in Massachusetts compared to 
communities that are predominantly Republican?  In each test, CC scores are 
regarded as dependent variables.  Those independent variables are categorical and 
associated with CC scores into two or three groups.  At last, an additional 
multivariate regression model to test towns’ social economic factors with dummy 
variables of the form of municipal governance will be applied.  
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Figure 5.4 Map for Different Government Types 
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Figure 5.5 Map for Different Town Meetings 
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Figure 5.6 Map for GOP/DEM Towns 
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5.3.4.2 The Outcomes 
Table 5.11 tells us, in regard with government forms, a city with a city 
mayor (government type 2)  has the highest CC score of 86, a town with a town 
manger (government type 1) ranks second with a CC score of 79, and the third is a 
town with an executive secretary with a CC score 61 (government type 3).  Towns 
with representative town meeting have higher mean CC score than those with an 
open town meeting.  DEM towns indeed perform better than GOP towns in terms 
of smart growth efforts, with average CC score of 67 and 58 respectively.  
 
Table 5.11 Descriptive Data for the Test on Political Factors 
 Valid 
N 
Mean  
CC 
Max 
CC 
Min 
CC 
Std.  
Dev. 
Gov_Town Manager 39 79 112 44 17.74 
Gov_City Council 189 61 107 11 18.56 
Gov_Executive Secretary 43 86 127 36 16.23 
Open Town Meeting 223 60 112 11 20.40 
Representative Town Meeting 42 72 105 37 17.71 
GOP Town 40 58 99 11 21.77 
DEM Town 273 67 127 12 21.27 
 
In addition, the outcome of the One-Way ANOVA test indicates that 
Gov_Town Manager and Gov_City Council are significantly different from towns 
with Gov_Executive Secretary.  The independent samples T test shows that 
different town meeting forms make a significant difference in term of smart growth 
efforts, and so do the political preferences of towns. 
The results of the statistical models are consistent with the conventional 
wisdom from of the literature - leadership plays an important role in promoting 
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smart growth policies.  As suggested by one interviewee, city council forms tend to 
have very strong central government and the town manager form usually will result 
in stronger executions of leadership.  The selected executive secretaries usually 
serve much shorter time than the rest. 
Another explanation of those results might be that city council form tends to 
be in more urban areas like Medford, Boston and so on.  Those towns tend to be 
denser, closer to a transit system and have more multi-family housing and affordable 
housing, hence, they win more points in CC criteria.  The town manager form 
towns also tend to be denser, bigger, and older than executive secretary form towns.  
This explanation touches my concerns of multi-colinearity problems among the 
independent variables in various tests in this research, in this case, the government 
forms might correlate with the town types in previous tests (e.g. towns with 
Gov_City Council largely overlapped with inner-core and regional urban centers).   
This research will give enough consideration to those colinearity problems in its 
conclusions.    
The multivariate regression model with social economic factors tests those 
hypotheses in table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12 Regression Model with the Form of Municipal Governance 
  Model 4 
  N = 223 
  F = 12.643  p(F)= 0.000   
  R = 0.611  R Square = 0.374 
Variables Coefficient t Pr 
Constant 121.166 10.02  
Pop2000 0.001 4.63 *** 
EDU_Bach 20.485 1.60  
Minority -15.573 -0.47  
Ownership -80.967 -4.81 *** 
Pop_Dens -0.006 -4.57 *** 
OpenSpace 18.276 1.72  
HWY_Dist_M -0.603 -2.25 * 
Med_HH_Inc 0.037 0.29  
Gov_Executive secretary -8.944 -2.78 ** 
Meeting_Representative -5.313 -1.40  
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001 
Dependent Variable: CC05-CC10 
Note: The variable of Gov_Town Manager, Gov_City Council and open town 
meeting have been automatically excluded because of collinearity problems 
 
The multivariate regression model shows that the municipal form of 
governance for towns with executive secretary is negatively associated with smart 
growth policies.  The inclusion of these variables has little effect on the remaining 
independent variables. 
An alternate explanation, identified through my interviews with municipal 
planners, is that the form of municipal governance is reflective of staff size.  
Municipalities with town managers or city mayor forms of governance are typically 
larger, and have a larger municipal staff with more specialized expertise and likely 
have a deeper pool of government resources to invest in promoting smart growth 
policies (e.g. more planning staff to work on SG issues).  I explore this issue 
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further in the next section, by classifying towns by whether they have a planning 
staff as a proxy for municipal resources. 
 
5.3.5 Test 5: From the View of Towns’ Planning Efforts 
5.3.5.1 Statistic Test 
In chapter 4, I discussed how hard the towns’ planners worked to complete 
the Commonwealth Capital application.  If they are better able to fill out the CC 
surveys, it is reasonable to assume that indicates that CC score should be highly 
related to the planner’s efforts in other areas of promoting smart growth policies.  
The hypothesis of this test is that towns with more sophisticated planning boards 
will be able to spend more labor resources and time in promoting smart growth 
policies.  I am going to test this hypothesis with both statistical models and 
quantitative analysis.   
 
Table 5.13 Descriptive Data for the Test on Towns’ Planning Efforts 
 
 N Mean  
CC 
Max 
CC 
Min 
CC 
Std.  
Dev. 
Towns With At Least A Planner 191 74 25 127 18.67 
Towns Without Any Planners 122 52 11 100 18.88 
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Table 5.14 Regression Model with the Planning Efforts 
 
 Model 4 
 N = 313 
 F = 20.904  p(F)= 0.000   
 R = 0.640  R Square = 0.409 
Variables Coefficient t Pr 
Constant 94.109 9.12  
Pop2000 0.000 1.24  
EDU_Bach 42.204 3.89 *** 
Minority 18.350 0.88  
Ownership -49.511 -4.12 *** 
Pop_Dens -0.002 -2.97 ** 
OpenSpace 7.180 0.77  
HWY_Dist_M -0.617 -2.71 ** 
Med_HH_Inc -0.250 -2.17 * 
DEM 1.913 0.16  
PL_Staff 16.682 7.12 *** 
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001 
Dependent Variable: CC05_CC10 
 
From table 5.13 we can see that the towns with at least one planner indeed 
have higher mean CC score than the towns without any planners.  The 
“independent samples T test” also shows that the mean CC scores between those 
two do make a significant difference.  The multivariate regression model shows 
that the status of planning employees is indeed associated with local smart growth 
efforts.  The rest of influential factors are quite similar as in previous tests.  
 In addition, statistics show that 47 towns have never applied to the CC 
program.  Sixteen of them (34%) have planners, 31 of them (66%) don’t have any 
planners.  It indicates that towns without any planners are less likely to have time 
and resources to apply to the CC program.  
5.3.5.2 Case Studies:  
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According to MGL Chapter 41, sections 81-A and 81-B, a city or town may 
establish a planning board if it has a population of less than 10,000.  Upon attaining 
a population of 10,000, it must establish a planning board.  About a half of the 351 
towns in Massachusetts has a planning board.  However, there are no data to 
represent sophisticated or less sophisticated planning boards.  The above statistical 
analysis is not sufficient to examine the hypothesis.  Therefore, I am going to 
reference a case study to help analyze the topic.  
 
Wellesley Vs Sharon: 
Wellesley has three full time planning employees and can be considered a 
sophisticated planning board.  Sharon doesn’t have any planners and only a 
temporary planning board, which could be considered a less sophisticated planning 
procedure.  Both towns have been categorized as Maturing Suburbs located in a 
suburban area of Boston and have high-income residents and vast residential land 
with well protected-open spaces. 
The different levels of planning efforts in these two towns show different 
outcomes in CC scores.  Although Sharon applied to the CC program every fiscal 
year and Wellesley only applied once in fiscal year 2005-2006, Sharon got a much 
lower score than Wellesley in 2006, 53 compared to Wellesley’s 72.  However, in 
the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 fiscal year, Sharon jumped to a high score of 92 and 
85 because of ongoing specific smart growth projects, which made Sharon’s rank 
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almost the same as Wellesley in the CC spectrum.  Sharon ranks 124 with and 
average CC score of 71.6 and Wellesley ranks 120 with average CC score of 72.   
The two towns take different efforts to apply to the CC program.  Sharon doesn’t 
necessarily have a very high ranking, because their previous scores are much lower 
than Wellesley’s.  This result shows towns with a sophisticated planning board (e.g. 
Wellesley) very possibly had a better overall status of smart growth policies during 
the past years.  
Sharon’s change in rank is because they recently hired planners.  The 
engineer in Sharon told me: “The planning board in Sharon is actually sophisticated 
and they hired professional people to do planning work and the towns’ 
administration gave a lot of support to the redevelopment project recently.  Many 
affordable housing projects are driven by the housing market, and the developers 
also have professional planners, engineers…”  
Ashby and Seekonk:  
Ashby and Seekonk are categorized as a rural town and a developing 
suburban town with population of 3,000 and 13,000 respectively.  Both towns lack 
a public transportation system and ranked very low in the CC spectrum.  Ashby 
ranked 197 of 313 towns with a CC score of 60.  Seekonk ranked 261 with a CC 
score of 44.  Ashby applied to the CC program for four times and Seekonk applied 
for three times.  Both towns’ scores didn’t change too much. 
 
 
 -107-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Map for Towns’ Planning Employment Status 
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Let’s look at their planning employees.  Ashby doesn’t have a formal 
planner and only has a temporary planning board.  The employees are all 
volunteers for the planning board and conservation commission, because it is a small 
rural town even without even a public septic system.  Seekonk has one planner 
with two part-time staff people in the planning department.  In this case we can 
consider Seekonk a more sophisticated planning department than Ashby.  However, 
their CC outcomes don’t prove our hypothesis.  I think it is because Ashby has 
more well preserved open space and adopted more environmental protection 
regulations than Seekonk, which allowed the town to gain more credits in the CC 
system.   
Actually, the town planner in Northampton also thinks planning staffs are an 
important reason for them to have a high CC score (See Section 4.3.3).  He gives 
two examples to explain his point: “a lot of communities like bike path projects.  
So it doesn’t matter the education process (the education of the general public by 
planning staffs), it matters that somebody can sit there and write the grant 
application. We just had staff and spend more time to bring grants.  For an open 
space acquisition project, in many towns there is a lot of political support for buying 
parks. You actually need a staff member to sit down, negotiating to buy land…”  
Therefore through above analysis, we may conclude the town with a more 
sophisticated planning board generally did better job to promote smart growth.  
However, the real influence of planner’s efforts on smart growth may vary case by 
case.  Towns’ overall smart growth status may largely be determined by the 
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homeownership, residents’ education level, the location, transportation system, 
leaderships and so on.   The planners’ influence is quite limited.     
5.4 Comments and Conclusions 
The above analysis gives us a broad view of the possible reasons for local 
smart growth efforts in Massachusetts.  Through the analysis with mixed methods I 
conclude: 
Homeownership represents the most important reason that influenced 
Towns’ smart growth policies’ efforts.  Fischel’s law gave us insight on the 
principle of American local governments’ smart growth policies.  This research 
statistically proved Fischel’s theory.  Other significant social economic factors 
include municipalities’ educational context, population density and accessibilities to 
highway systems: generally, more educated residents in a town will welcome smart 
growth policies more.  The population density is not as significant as people 
usually imagine having a large positive association with smart growth policies.  It 
is a more significant factor in a segmented area (e.g. metropolitan area).  Towns 
closer to highway infrastructure are highly associated with local smart growth 
efforts and are those with public transportation systems.   
Location in western Massachusetts and eastern Massachusetts makes a 
difference in term of promoting smart growth policies.  When examining the 
maturing suburbs, not only some of the above factors but also the wealth of towns 
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are related to local smart growth efforts.  Usually towns with higher average 
household incomes may be less likely to welcome smart growth. 
Towns’ development levels are also associated with their smart growth effort.  
Generally more developed towns will be more likely to adopt better smart growth 
policies.  Rural towns with low population and low density are less likely to 
endorse smart growth, which not only happened in Massachusetts but in Wisconsin 
(Edward 2007).   The regional urban center towns have the highest average CC 
score among five types of towns because of their diverse characteristics.  In the 
Boston suburban area (maturing suburbs), towns’ education, wealth levels and open 
spaces are the key factors associated with smart growth.  Usually more 
well-educated residents will result in better smart growth policy adoptions and 
wealthier towns with more open spaces may be less likely to encourage mixed use of 
land and high density development.  In the maturing suburbs and developing towns, 
the association of open spaces with local smart growth efforts changes its direction, 
from negative to positive.  It is an interesting finding for future exploration. 
Different political formats create different outcomes for smart growth efforts.  
The authority of leadership plays a key role in promoting smart growth not only at 
the state level but also at the local level.  In Massachusetts, Democratic towns 
generally perform better than Republican ones to promote smart growth.  
Representative town meeting better endorses smart growth policies than open town 
meeting.   
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Planners’ work also affects the local smart growth efforts.  Towns with 
planning staffs usually have more resources and do a better job than towns without 
any planners in terms of smart growth promotion.  However, the planners’ efforts 
to influence the local zoning bylaws are quite limited.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Both independent samples the T test and One-Way ANOVA test are based 
on two assumptions: 1) the dependent variables (CCs) are normally distributed; 2) 
the groups (CCs in categories) have approximately equal variance on the dependent 
variable.  I will test the assumption 1) through QQ plot and assumption 2) through 
“Levene's Test”.  
The normal Q-Q plot graphically compares the distribution of a given 
variable to the normal distribution (represented by a straight line).  The straight line 
represents what the data would look like if it were perfectly normally distributed.  
The actual data is represented by the squares plotted along this line. The closer the 
squares are to the line, the more normally distributed our data looks.  Here, most of 
our points fall almost perfectly along the line. This is a good indicator that the 
CC05-CC10 data is normally distributed.  I will do the “Levene’s Test” in each of 
specific tests.  
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 7 “Homevoter Hypothesis” presents a persuasive argument that most local 
governments in the US are politically dominated by homeowners who manipulate 
zoning and other policies to maximize the market values of their homes.  
 “The most obvious difference between stockholders of municipalities - the 
homevoters - and those of businesses is that municipal voters never get more than 
one vote per resident.  Almost all business corporations choose to allocate voting 
rights by shares, so that someone who holds ten shares has nine more votes than 
someone with one share.  Municipalities allocate votes so that each resident has the 
same number- one- regardless of how large or how valuable his or her property 
is…They almost never enfranchise tenants and, where unit ownership is the basis of 
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voting, always permit an owner of multiple units to have multiple votes.” (Fischel  
2001) 
 After reviewing Fischel’s work, Down (2001) argues that the homevoter 
hypothesis reveals “a huge obstacle to creating affordable housing in the suburbs 
and to several other elements of smart growth policies…there is a distinct conflict 
between smart growth and Fischel’s Law as put into practice by American 
homevoters”.  The statistical test in this research matches Down and Fischel’s 
conclusion.   
8 The full text of Fischel’s argument follows:  
“The reason that local governments perform better is that the benefits and 
costs of local decision making are reflected in the value of property in the 
jurisdiction. The homevoter hypothesis holds that homeowners, who are the 
most numerous and politically influential group within most localities, are 
guided by their concern for the value of their homes to make political 
decisions that are more efficient than those that would be made at a higher 
level of government.  Homeowners are acutely aware that local amenities, 
public services, and taxes affect the largest asset they own.” 
 
9 The spatial weight matrix in this test is set up by Geoda with “queen 
continuity” relationships.  The reasons for this establishment are: only 313 of 351 
town samples could fully correspond to the test and the missing data have created 
geographic gaps among towns in the map.   The “queen continuity”, which adds a 
spatial corner relationship between two neighbors without a common border, will 
maximize the possibility to form the adjacent neighbors.  
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CHAPTER 6  
THE IMPACT ON LAND USE 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter addresses the question of whether the local smart growth efforts 
are associated with a reduction in urban sprawl in Massachusetts.  To address this 
question, I develop various statistical models to estimate the relationship between 
several urban sprawl indicators and Commonwealth Capital scores.  
 The quantitative model can be interpreted as:    
                        USI = F (CC)                     (5) 
 Where, USI is the urban sprawl indicator and represents the change of land 
patterns of towns in Massachusetts.  CC represents the policy and is the single 
independent variable.    
Carruthers’ analytic framework for evaluating smart growth policies (figure 
2.1) identifies many factors that contribute to land development patterns, including 
institutional framework, program design (different levels of policies) and regional 
land market.   In this measurement I will mainly focus on local zoning practice (CC 
scores) to estimate land development, which might yield quite controversial results (I 
also discussed this in the data limitation section, section 3.4).  However, the 
approximate data calculating process indicates the measurement in this chapter will be 
approximate and it is not harmful to have a pilot examination to inspire future studies.  
I want to explain the reasons I consider local zoning the main factor associated with 
land use development.   
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 First, the measurement takes place in the-incentive based smart growth context 
of Massachusetts, where it is politically unlikely to have state mandates on local 
planning because of the strong home rule.  Thus, we can assume state level policies 
and institutional framework in Carruthers’ analytic framework have quite limited 
influences on the local zoning practice, which determines the outcomes of land 
development patterns. 
 Second, in regard to the regional land market force, I would assume it has to 
take effect through local zoning policies.  For instance, through analysis of interview 
data I find the developers in a town have to strictly follow the requirement of the 
town’s zoning bylaws whether or not they endorse smart growth (e.g. the stories from 
Sharon and Hingham) and they sometimes strategically persuade the town to make 
changes in their zoning bylaws.  It indicates market forces can not act independently 
without the influence of local zoning bylaws.  Thus, it may be feasible to exclude 
market forces to avoid collinearity problems among the independent variables in the 
conceptual model design.  The relationship between market force and local zoning 
practice in Massachusetts could be another interesting research topic to explore in the 
future.   
 Last, this conceptual model (Model II) is constructed in comparison with the 
conceptual model in chapter five (Model I), though they have same concerns during 
the design process.  I would rather regard both models as correlation tests than 
causality tests.  The reason that I do not add urban sprawl indicator as an 
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independent factor in the Model I is that the variable is created totally different from 
the factors in Model I (see independent variables 1-9 in table 5.1).  The urban sprawl 
indicator has a different level of approximation and it might generate more 
controversial conclusions.  Hence, I separate the variable of USI into a different 
conceptual design, which represents another research direction to explore.  
6.2 Defining Urban Sprawl Indicator 
 Building upon my review of the existing literature, I use two different 
indicators to measure recent changes in the level of urban sprawl for municipalities in 
Massachusetts.  The two main Urban Sprawl Indicators (USIs) are defined as:  
                                                         (6) 
                                                                                    
and, 
                                                         (7) 
                                                                                     
where, 
USI = Urban Sprawl Indicator 
   Δ[RLC] = Change of Residential Land Cover through the year ti – tj 
    Sum[BP] ti- tj = Total Building Permit issued through the year ti – tj 
   Δ [Pop] ti- tj = Population Change through the year ti – tj 
    ti – tj =  Beginning year; Ending year 
  
 Δ [RLC] ti – tj 
USIII  ( ti-tj) = 
  Δ [Pop] ti – tj 
 Δ [RLC] ti – tj 
USII ( ti-tj)  =  
  Sum[BP] ti – tj 
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Both USIs measure sprawl based on changes in residential land use cover (Δ 
[RLC]) divided by a standardizing factor.  In each measure, I measure land use 
change using two different time periods: 1999 to 2005 and 1985 to 1999.  The two 
indicators differ in their treatment of the standardizing factor in the denominator.  
USII (6) divides the change in residential land cover by the number of building 
permits (BP) as measures in year 1999 to 2005.  USIII (7) uses the change of  
municipal population (Pop) as the standardizing variable.  I create two series of 
population data to use as the denominator in USIII: the change between 1990-2000 
and the change between 2000-2006.   
USII(1999-2005)  is the key urban sprawl indicator to be examined in this chapter 
and denotes the most recent land development in Massachusetts.  It is considered a 
more sensitive variable associated with Commonwealth Capital scores than the USIII 
(1990-2000) and USIII (1999-2005).  The USIII is created to compare the land development 
pattern before and after Commonwealth Capital policies (USIII (1990-2000) Vs USIII 
(1999-2005) ).  However, as there is no building permit data available for early 1990s I 
could only use population change as the standardizing factor for the residential land 
cover changes for the year before the policies (between 1990-2000).  The change in 
population as a standardized factor cannot properly explain the sprawl phenomena at 
the town level in Massachusetts, because the population in many towns stayed stable 
and even decreased in the past while residential land continued. 
In addition, the USIII could have additional error due to the of time gaps 
between land use change period and population change period: Δ[RLC]1985-1999 / Δ 
 -118-
[Pop]1990-2000 ; Δ[RLC]1999-2005 / Δ [Pop]2000-2006.  To avoid the problem, again I will 
assume the population status has been relatively stable in Massachusetts since 1985 
and it is feasible to apply the limited data to create two series of approximate USIII.  
In fact, the neglect of time gaps between land change and population change has been 
utilized in Ingram et al.’s (2009) report.10   Therefore, the USIII (1990-2000) and USIII 
(1999-2005) are designed only to have an approximate observation on the outcomes prior 
to and after the municipal smart growth policies.   
6.3 Data Sources and the Limitations 
 Δ [RLC]1990 –2000 are obtained from the Land Use Summary Statistics Set one11 
from MassGIS.  It represents the residential land coverage change between 1985 and 
1999 and will be used as the numerator in USIII.  MassGIS already has land cover 
summary files for each type of land use between the year 1985 and 1999.  However, 
to measure Δ [RLC]1999 –2005 I had to develop new methods to extract the data through 
several GIS polygon files. 
 The land cover files for 1999 and 2005 were created in different methods by 
MassGIS12, they were not immediately compatible and required additional 
geoprocessing prior to calculation.  First, I assume the 2005 Land Use data layer is 
more precise than the 1999 layer, as evidenced by the somewhat crude boundaries 
presented in the 1999 file relative to the more refined ones in the more recent version. 
In most of areas where 1999 and 2005 residential polygons exist simultaneously the 
1999 polygons are larger than 2005 ones13 (see figure 6.1).  By “clipping” the older 
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file with the newer one I was able to identify the spillover areas from the 2005 
residential polygons -- denoting the new developed land between 1999 and 2005 (see 
figure 6.2). 
 Following the clipping procedure, the next step is to geographically assign the 
identified areas of land cover change to municipalites.  Hence, I transformed the 
polygon data into raster data and used a Zonal Statistics technique to aggregate the 
new data into areas for each town14.   The GIS process of Δ [RLC]1999 –2005 is 
demonstrated by figure 6.1 and 6.2. 
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Figure 6.1 Geoprocessing of Residential Land Cover Change, 1999 -2005 (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Geoprocessing of Residential Land Cover Change, 1999-2005 (2) 
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Building permits are used to standardize land use cover change because a 
similar method was adopted to create the Land Consumption Indicator by Ji et al. 
(2006) (see section 2.4.2) and it is applicable in this research to define the sprawl by 
the developed land per new residential housing unit.  On the other hand, the 
qualitative analysis indicates 2/3 part of the CC criteria is designed to encourage 
mixed use of land and compact development, hence, one of the hypotheses in this test 
would be that higher CC scores will lead less developed land per residential house.  
Data on municipal building permits were obtained from US Census Bureau15, 
which provides the annual data on the number of new privately-owned residential 
housing units authorized by building permits through the years 1996-2007.  I use the 
sum of new residential building permits from 1999-2005 to capture the rate of land 
consumption dedicated toward the construction of new residential housing (for the 
USII(1999-2005)).  
The annual estimates of the population data for the towns in Massachusetts 
from 2000-2008 were obtained from the Executive Office of Labor and Workforce 
Development in Massachusetts, as originally reported by the U.S. Census Annual 
Population Estimates program.   
As implied by the preceding discussion, the indicators of new developed 
residential land between 1999 and 2005 are only approximate and likely contain some 
error.  While there is no way to truly assess the severity of this error, I believe that 
the indicators of land use change that I have constructed are still a reliable and 
accurate measure of municipal land use change.  Furthermore, there is no reason to 
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suspect greater or lesser amounts of accuracy across towns of different types and 
therefore limited measurement bias.   
In addition, the USIs defined in this research have only capture part of 
Galster's (2001) eight distinct dimensions of sprawl including density, compactness 
and concentration, because most of the residential land consumption happened at the 
suburban area rather than the town center in the municipal level and the residential 
land change per building permit might mostly affect the density related pattern. 
The direction of causality is inherently unclear in this specification.  It is hard 
to tell what happened first - the land consumption or the policies because of the 
overlapping periods covered by the dependent and independent variables.  Policies 
typically take years to have obvious effects on land changes.  Because the 
Commonwealth Capital program started in 2003 and the core part of the hypothesis 
happened between 1999 and 2005, where USII(1999-2005) is applied in the model, it 
might result in the logic chaos of intention and outcomes.  However, again I would 
assume the tests in this chapter are a pilot study of examining municipal smart growth 
efforts in an incentive based smart growth context and would rather regard the 
statistic outcomes of the tests as discovering the possible associations than examining 
the “intention and outcomes”. 
 In regard to those concerns, USIII (1990-2000) and USIII (1999-2005) are designed to 
analyze whether there is a divergent pattern among high/meddle/low scoring CC 
communities prior to the CC scores (1990-2000) and after them (2000-2006). 
 -123-
6.4 Modeling and Discussion 
6.4.1 The Bivariate Correlation Analysis on USII (1999-2005) 
 I begin my empirical analysis of the urban sprawl indicator using the 
descriptive data of USII(1999-2005).  Different from the multivariate OLS regression 
method in Chapter 5, I then use bivariate (Pearson) correlations to assess the strength 
of the relationships between CC and USII(1999-2005).  The bivariate regression model 
assumes both Y and X are random variables with normal distribution16.  It implies a 
co-relationship between variables that puts both on an equal footing and does not 
distinguish between them by referring to one as dependent and the other as the 
independent variables, though the basic computational procedures are the same as the 
classic regression model.  In regard to the concerns of intention and outcome chaos 
between CC and USII(1999-2005), we think the bivariate correlation test would offer a 
proper snapshot of how smart growth policies relates to the land development pattern.  
The bivariate (Pearson) correlation model will also be utilized to examine the 
hypotheses in various geographic regions in the next examination, such as in 
eastern/western Massachusetts or among different types of towns. 
 Table 6.1 Descriptive Data for USII (1999-2005) 
  Acres/BP Mean Max Min Std. 
Dev. 
N 
Across Massachusetts USII(1999-2005) 1.74 13.01 0.25 1.475 351 
Eastern Massachusetts USII(1999-2005) 1.25 13.01 0.25 1.083 223 
Western Massachusetts USII(1999-2005) 2.61 8.99 0.39 1.663 128 
Inner Core USII(1999-2005) 1.88 13.01 0.27 3.101 16 
Regional Urban Centers USII(1999-2005) 0.98 3.20 0.35 0.526 41 
Maturing Suburbs USII(1999-2005) 0.91 2.28 0.25 0.450 63 
Developing Towns USII(1999-2005) 1.62 5.98 0.44 0.971 155 
Rural Towns USII(1999-2005) 3.07 8.99 0.39 1.805 76 
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 Table 6.1 indicates eastern Massachusetts consumes less land per new 
residential development than western Massachusetts with average USII(1999-2005) of 
1.25 and 2.61 respectively.  This supports findings from previous studies - because 
approximately 2/3 of the population inhabits the eastern third of the state, the two 
regions have different reasons and patterns of sprawl (Geigis et al. 2007).  “West of 
Boston, growth followed major highways, perpetuating patterns of sprawl 
development.  In the less developed western regional, rural sprawl increased as 
homes on large lots proliferated on what had been prime farmland, increasing 
residents’ driving times and reducing the congeniality and liveliness of small town 
centers.” (Geigis et al. 2007) 
 
Table 6.2 Bivariate (Pearson) Correlation Tests for USII (1999-2005) and CC Scores 
  
The Bivariate Correlation tests (table 6.2) tell us that Commonwealth Capital 
scores are significantly associated with USII (1999-2005) across Massachusetts.  This 
 
USII (1999-2005) 
(Natural Log Transformed) 
Pr  Geographic Division N 
-0.351 *** Across Massachusetts 313 
-0.209  ** Eastern Massachusetts 196 
-0.282 ** Western Massachusetts 117 
0.367    Inner Core 16 
0.163   Regional Urban Centers 41 
-0.156   Maturing Suburbs 56 
-0.214  **  Developing Towns 138 
Average 
CC 
Scores 
2005 to 
2010  
0.044   Rural Towns 62 
* = p<0.05  ** = p<0.01  *** = p<0.001  
 -125-
finding matches the qualitative analysis in the prior chapters: towns which tend to be 
denser, have more multi-family housing, affordable housing, and compact 
development, may usually have higher CC scores.   
 Table 6.2 also indicates that smart growth policies are significantly associated 
with CC scores in eastern and western Massachusetts.  We observe a negative 
coefficient for both regions.  The OLS regression test also shows that both western 
Massachusetts and eastern Massachusetts passed the test with negative association.  
The absolute value of coefficient in western Massachusetts is slightly larger than the 
eastern Massachusetts, which implies that more land per new house will be consumed 
when CC decreased in one unit in the western Massachusetts.  It demonstrates 
sprawl in western Massachusetts has more varieties associated with land use policies 
than eastern Massachusetts.  Again the phenomena can be explained by preceding 
paragraph by Geigis et al. (2007). 
 To answer the question: are local smart growth efforts associated differently in 
different type of towns?  Table 6.2 tells us that only in the developing suburbs are 
the CC scores negatively associated with sprawl indicators and passed the regression 
test.  All the other types of towns fail the bivariate correlation test and the regression 
test.  Again these outcomes might be affected by the size of test samples and the data 
approximation.  However, it might also indicate that the local smart growth efforts 
mostly take effect in the developing suburbs in Massachusetts.  As a matter of fact, 
the finding matches Hamin’s (2006) conclusion that the suburban communities tended 
to spend more on affordable housing and have actually been big winners through the 
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Community Preservation Act in Massachusetts.  It also proves “Fischel’s Law”: the 
effects of homevoter hypothesis and smart growth policies more likely take place in 
fast growing suburban areas.  
6.4.2 The Spatial Autoregressive Test on USII (1999-2005) 
 Processing USII (1999-2005) and CC data with both the OLS regression model and 
the spatial autoregressive model (spatial lag model) will provide an interesting 
comparison.  In the last section the correlation model cannot untangle the 
interdependent relationships among variables, so the classical OLS regression model 
will address the shortcomings and test the hypothesis that the adoption of a greater 
number of smart growth techniques leads to a greater reduction in sprawl in the 
municipalities of Massachusetts.  The spatial autoregressive model will explain 
whether there is a spatial dependence between those variables.  Ignoring spatial 
dependence will tend to underestimate the real variance in the data.  
Table 6.3 Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence 
 
 
 
 
 
 Through the same procedure used in section 5.3.1.2, Moran’s I test on the 
OLS yields a significant and positive result of 0.3192 (z = 8.4619 and p < 0.0000000).  
These show a significant and positive spatial relationship.  Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
was used for choosing spatial lag or error model.  Lagrange Multiplier tests on the 
Test MI/DF z-value Probability 
Moran’I (error) 0.319155 8.4618926 0.0000000 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 83.7617719 0.0000000 
Robust LM (lag) 1 17.7032645 0.0000258 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 68.5604814 0.0000000 
Robust LM (error) 2 2.5019740 0.1137037 
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OLS show that LM (lag) and LM (error) are both significant and positive values of 
83.7618 (p < 0.00000) and 68.5605 (p < 0.0000000) respectively.  However, Only 
Robust LM (lag) is significant with p value far smaller than 0.05, which indicates the 
hypothesis can be better fit by spatial lag model (table 6.3).  The outcomes of OLS 
regression model and spatial lag model are shown in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 OLS Bivariate Regression Model and Spatial Lag Model 
 Independent 
Variables 
 
R Square Coefficients 
T(z) 
value 
p 
OLS Regression Model CC05-CC10 0.123 -0.011 -6.614 0.000 
CC05-CC10 0.353 -0.005 -3.399 0.001 Spatial Lag Model 
W_USI I  0.822 27.197 0.000 
Dependent Variable: USII (1999-2005)  (Natural Log Transformed) 
Table 6.4 provides the estimates from an OLS regression model between the 
variables of USII (1999-2005) and CC scores in 313 towns with and without a spatial lag 
of y.  We observe a negative coefficient for the CC05-CC10 of -0.011 and R square 
0.123 in the OLS without the spatially lagged y.  The OLS linear regression test 
indicates the towns’ smart growth efforts generally controlled land consumption very 
well in past years (see figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.3 The Linear Regression for USII (1999-2005) and CC 
 In contrast, in the spatially lagged y model, the estimated coefficient for the 
CC05-CC10 is -0.005, about a half of its original size.  Table 6.4 also indicates the 
spatial lag model has a higher value of R square test than OLS regression model 
(0.353 vs 0.123), which reinforces our belief that the spatial lag of y adds something 
important to specifying the distribution of USIs, beyond what we would expect from 
CC scores.  The outcome indicates the cluster of sprawl in the neighborhood 
municipalities may weaken the effectiveness of smart growth policies in the central 
municipality.  So the net effect of sprawl ought to be taken into account to 
investigate the policy effectiveness in the future. 
6.3.4 Comparison Analysis on USIII (1990-2000) and USIII (1999-2005) 
 Because both USIII (1990-2000) and USIII (1999-2005) are constructed through 
approximate process and they may not fit the regression tests very well, I start the 
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empirical examination with descriptive analytical methods in order to test the urban 
sprawl indicators prior to the Commonwealth Capital policies and after.  
 For the descriptive component of my analysis, I converted the 
interval-measured CC scores into five ordinal classes and compare differences in 
mean value of the USI measures across each class.  Each class has equal number of 
municipalities (62 municipalities).  The specific class can be interpreted as: Low 
(11-46), Middle-Low (47-61), Middle (62-70), Middle-High (71-83), and High 
(84-127).   
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Figure 6.4 Quantile Map for Average Commonwealth Capital Score, 2005-2010 
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Table 6.5 Descriptive Data for USIII (1990-2000) 
  Acres/Pop Mean Max Min Std. 
Dev. 
N 
Across Massachusetts USIII(1990-2000) 0.66 27.95 -25.34 3.36 351 
Eastern Massachusetts USIII(1990-2000) 0.44 25.69 -25.34 2.93 223 
Western Massachusetts USIII(1990-2000) 1.05 27.95 -13.68 3.98 128 
Inner Core USIII(1990-2000) 0.01 0.18 -0.04 0.05 16 
Regional Urban Centers USIII(1990-2000) 0.08 1.82 -2.43 0.69 41 
Maturing Suburbs USIII(1990-2000) -0.02 8.26 -25.34 3.93 63 
Developing Towns USIII(1990-2000) 1.01 27.95 -13.68 3.76 155 
Rural Towns USIII(1990-2000) 0.97 11.15 -10.94 3.10 76 
 
Table 6.6 Descriptive Data for USIII (1999-2005) 
  Acres/Pop Mean Max Min Std. 
Dev. 
N 
Across Massachusetts USIII(1999-2005) 1.24 102.00 -188.28 15.59 351 
Eastern Massachusetts USIII(1999-2005) 1.77 88.27 -24.21 8.66 223 
Western Massachusetts USIII(1999-2005) 0.31 102.00 -188.28 23.18 128 
Inner Core USIII(1999-2005) -0.23 0.37 -3.75 0.95 16 
Regional Urban Centers USIII(1999-2005) -1.15 3.84 -20.54 3.98 41 
Maturing Suburbs USIII(1999-2005) 3.22 88.27 -8.22 12.86 63 
Developing Towns USIII(1999-2005) 1.25 53.55 -26.33 6.51 155 
Rural Towns USIII(1999-2005) 1.15 102.00 -188.28 29.91 76 
 
 The descriptive data of USIII (1990-2000) and USIII (1999-2005) in table 6.5 and table 
6.6 provide another angle on the sprawl status in Massachusetts.  Through 
observations I find more land per capita has been consumed during the years of 
1999-2005 than the last decade of 1990-2000, with the mean USIII of 1.24 and 0.66 
respectively.  I also find sprawl issues might be aggravated in eastern Massachusetts 
in recent years over the last decade, because USIII increases from the east to the west 
during 1990-2000 and decreases during 1999-2005.  This phenomena may be 
explained by much more land having been developed in eastern Massachusetts in 
recent years while the population has not changed too much across the state.  In 
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addition, it is interesting that more sprawl happened in developing towns and rural 
towns in both time periods because they have more developed land per capita than the 
rest of the types of towns.  
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Figure 6.5 Test on the USIII (1990-2000) with CCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Test on USIII (1999-2005) with CCs 
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 Figures 6.5 and 6.6 represent the relationships between residential land 
changes per capita and CC scores in the two periods of 1990-2000 and 1999-2005.  
Because the land change data are from two different sources, it is not applicable to 
compare them side by side in a coordinated system.  However, it is interesting to 
examine the bar patterns to answer the question: was land consumption significantly 
changed after the Commonwealth Capital program?  
 The observation is approximate: the bar patterns are a little bit different.  It 
seems the policies take better effects in recent years (1999-2005) among those low to 
middle CC score towns, because the bars decrease in the CC scores of 11-70 during 
year 1999-2005.  In the middle-high to high CC score towns the bars increase in both 
periods.  It implies that the polices did not change the land consumption in those 
towns.  In addition, both of the models failed the regression test. 
The different pattern of bars may indicate that after the incentive smart growth 
approaches adopted in Massachusetts (after 2000), they indeed changed land 
consumption status in some towns, which possibly are the developing towns with 
middle-low to middle CC scores.  
6.5 Comments and Discussions 
 The above analysis provides a comprehensive view of the relationships 
between two variables – CC scores and urban sprawl indicators.  It indicates local 
smart growth efforts are significant associated with towns’ land consumption status 
 -135-
across Massachusetts and the towns with better smart growth efforts usually have had 
better land use controls during past years, although the strength may vary case by case.  
For example, the towns in western Massachusetts generally have more significant and 
negative associations with CC scores than the eastern Massachusetts towns.   
When looking at different types of towns, I find the impact of local smart 
growth efforts was more significant in the developing suburbs of Massachusetts.   
These findings match previous studies and Fischel’s Law.  
 The results from the spatial regression analysis further suggest that sprawl is a 
net-effect phenomenon and the clustering of sprawl in a region may weaken the 
town’s efforts at growth management.  
Through an approximate observation on the bar graphs, I find that after the 
incentive-based smart growth approaches adopted in Massachusetts, they have some 
impacts on land development patterns.  
 
 
                                                 
10 See Page 10, Ingram,G. K. and Yu-Hung Hong. 2009. Evaluating Smart 
Growth, State and Local Policy Outcomes. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy. (the Lite Version of the original book) 
11 “The Land Use Summary Statistics Set one aggregates land use areas on a 
town-by-town basis for the commonwealth of Massachusetts. The statistics were 
generated from the polygon attribute table from MassGIS Land Use Datalayer for the 
years for which land use data have been collected statewide, 1971, 1985, and 1999. 
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The 21-class MacConnell land use categories were used as the basis of the tables, 
which summarize acreage of each land use type, ‘developed’ vs. ‘undeveloped’ land, 
and change from 1971 to 1985 and 1985 to 1999.”  
I aggregated all the residential land use code items No. 10 through No.13 in 
the column of “the change from 1985 to 1999” in the Land Use Summary spreadsheet.  
Those items can be explained in the MacConnell land use classification system as: 10, 
Multi-family Residential; 11, High Density Residential (Residential Smaller than 1/4 
acre lots); 12, Medium Density Residential (Residential 1/4 - 1/2 acre lots); 13, Low 
Density Residential (Residential Larger than 1/2 acre lots). (MassGIS). 
12 The different processes of producing 1999 and 2005 data layers are: 
The 1999 data layer was made on the statewide 1:25,000 aerial color infrared 
photograph by the UMASS Department of Forestry Resource Mapping Project 
(RMP). The RMP staffs visually compared the 1985 and 1999 photography and 
digitalized the land use data into individual community digital coverages using a PC 
version of Arc/INFO software. 
The 2005 data layer was based on the Impervious Surface data derived from 
the 2005 ortho images and land use labels were transferred to the impervious surface 
dataset with these rules: where no change took place from 1999 to 2005, the land use 
labels were derived from the use code in MassGIS Assessors’ Parcels data (where 
parcel data existed), and from the 1999 land use data wherever no parcel data was 
available. Where change had occurred, the land use category was assigned manually. 
In addition, there are more detailed requirements on the definition of residential 
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categories when RMP staffs manually determined the residential land boundaries. 
(MassGIS)   
Therefore, the 2005 data layer is more detailed and accurate than 1999 data 
layer.  
13  It is because 1999 data were created visually and the digitalizing process 
was rough, but 2005 data were digitalized more accurately by transferring them from 
assessor’s parcel maps. 
14 During the polygon to raster process, the cell size has been set to 5 meters, 
which will result in a pixel with 25 square meters in the raster layer.  In addition, I 
deleted the polygons that were smaller than 15,000 square feet to improve the data 
accuracy, in which I assume a single residential building can’t cover an area smaller 
than 15,000 square feet and those data can be regarded as insignificant.   
15 US Census has the building permit data for each town at MA from the 
year 1996-2007 : http://censtats.census.gov/bldg/bldgprmt.shtml 
16 We have proved that CC005_10 have a normal distribution through QQ 
plot in chapter five.  The below histogram of USII(1999-2005) shows this variable is not 
normally distributed .  The skewness indicates it is positively skewed.   
However, a natural log transformation to USII(1999-2005) indicates a normal distribution 
of the data as shown below.  Therefore, I applied the natural log transformed 
USII(1999-2005) in the Bivariate Correlation (Pearson) test and the next  OLS regression 
and spatial autoregressive models. 
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CHAPTER 7  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Though the mixed approaches and comprehensive analysis, I conclude the 
towns with relatively higher Commonwealth Capital scores in Massachusetts may 
share below characteristics: 
? Towns with diverse land bases sharing mixed characteristics 
(rural/suburban/urban) 
? Towns with smaller percent of homeowners 
? Towns closer to highway systems 
? Towns with more educated residents 
Towns having relatively lower Commonwealth Capital scores in 
Massachusetts may be: 
? Small towns far away from highway system or with weak municipal 
governance 
? Rural towns with small number of population 
? Wealthy suburban towns with much more open spaces 
7.1 Policy Segmentation 
“One of the critical political challenges to state-level reform is the disparity in 
interests, values, and resources between rural and urban communities.” (Hamin 2006) 
This research reveals that Massachusetts’ towns/cities dominate the practice 
and politics of land use.  It also indicates that Massachusetts’ towns/cities share a 
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few spatial characteristics in terms of the reasons and outcomes of their smart growth 
efforts.  Therefore, this research suggests it is necessary to apply different incentive 
strategies and follow the nature of policies’ spatial segmentation in order to improve 
the effectiveness of smart growth policies.  
For example, the tests tell us that the fast growing suburban areas (e.g. Boston 
suburbs) are usually affected by smart growth policies much more than the rest of the 
state.  The residents’ educational and wealth levels and amount of open space are 
key factors associated with smart growth in those areas.  Therefore, the incentives to 
diversify the communities’ household incomes and offer more rental housing could be 
an effective way to change towns’ attitudes toward local zoning.   I think the 
incentives for affordable housing can meet those objectives very well.  However, 
current smart growth legislation Chapter 40R, which requires 20 percent of new 
housing developments to be affordable doesn’t consider the necessity of spatial 
segmentation for affordable housing.  My suggestion is that the areas with similar 
characteristics may meet the same requirements for affordable housing.  The Boston 
suburban areas may require a different threshold for affordable housing to encourage 
smart growth goals.  
On the other hand, rural communities with small populations usually have 
very low CC scores and have fewer chances to win state funds, though this research 
concludes there is no significant bias in the CC scoring system.  The tests on urban 
sprawl indicators also suggest that smart growth practices are less likely to be 
effective in rural areas.  The policy segmentation requires specific consideration of 
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rural/small communities’ anticipation.  For example, it is applicable to funnel state 
funds for environmental protection and natural resource conservation by comparing 
the CC scores only within rural or small communities which are usually located far 
away from the highway system.  Thus, the winners of state funds would be through 
the competition among the towns with similar characteristics.   
In addition, this research indicates that eastern and western Massachusetts 
have different contexts to promote smart growth and may need different policy 
strategies. Special efforts ought to be adopted to support the smart growth in western 
Massachusetts.  In fact, state government has already taken a few initiatives.  For 
example, Governor Patrick announced a partnership with the City of Springfield in 
2007 in order to boost public safety, education and housing in western Massachusetts 
and it is “a new collaboration between the city and the Commonwealth to augment the 
work of the Finance Control Board to develop a working economy that will sustain a 
working community.”  The Western Massachusetts Office was opened in 2007 and 
will serve the counties of Western Massachusetts (Massachusetts Government 
Website 2010).  Those efforts will eventually contribute to the smart growth goals in 
western Massachusetts.   
7.2 Policy Transparency and Structure Arrangement 
A lot of town planners mentioned the importance of educational process for 
smart growth, in which they think visualizing the plans or designs will significantly 
improve the general public’s views on smart growth policies.  This research also 
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reveals that the educational levels of residents are highly associated with the local 
smart growth efforts.  Towns with higher a percentage of well educated people may 
accept smart growth policies more easily than the towns with fewer ones.   
The interviewees also told me the planning professionals play important roles 
in educating the general public.  However, many towns in Massachusetts lack 
planners.  According to the data only about 60% towns have at least one planner. 
Lack planning professionals in the towns could be an obstacle to educate more people 
about smart growth.    
In addition, this research reveals that governmental structure will influence the 
outcomes of smart growth promotion, not only at the state level but also at the 
municipal level.  At the municipal level, a stronger governmental authority and 
determined leadership may achieve smart growth goals more efficiently.  Therefore, 
I think the communication between planning departments and towns’ leadership 
affects the outcome of policy adoptions.  The interactivities between the public and 
local authorities at town meeting are the best chances to promote smart growth to both 
sides.  This research indicates representative town meeting might result in a better 
consensus.   
At the state level, Massachusetts hasn’t reformed its land use laws since the 
Model Land Use codes were implemented back in the 1950s.  The state government 
lacks of the authority to review the consistency issues.  Although the 
Commonwealth Capital program is supposed to incentivize local policy reform, this 
research discovers that the current stimuli are not effective enough and the purpose of 
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creating competitions among municipalities has failed.  I think advocating legislators 
to consider substantive reforms to the outdated state land use laws could be the first 
step in changing the state governmental functions regarding planning issues.  
7.3 Broaden Local Level Networks 
Massachusetts lacks regional coordination among town plans and “regional 
planning is currently limited to regional planning agencies that are largely 
consultancies, offering fee-for service planning to smaller communities that can’t 
afford full time planners and also collecting regional data and providing advice and 
some coordination for federal transportation investments.” (Geigis et al. 2007)   
In regard to the above argument, I think the regional issues in Massachusetts 
could possibly be solved by incentives from state government to broaden the local 
level network:  
“Smart growth policies adopted by local governments with no regional 
coordination are less likely to yield good outcomes because of negative spillover 
effects from communities pursuing their parochial interests.”(Ingram et al. 2009) 
According the findings of this research, Massachusetts’ regional agencies lacks 
effective authority to promote the coordination among municipalities, particularly 
because of the existence of home rule.   State government may encourage more 
regional cooperation through specific projects.  For example, clean energy projects 
or traffic emission reduction projects that may involve a few municipalities will be 
good opportunities for regional cooperation.  Encouraging smaller projects could be 
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another strategy to create local network.  For instance, creating smaller trips among 
communities, having more connectivity among communities, building more walkable 
street and so on.  This research concludes towns with same influential factors in the 
model may be easier to reach a consensus on smart growth projects and state 
government could provide specific support and projects to these kinds of communities 
and improve the efficiency of their activities.  Commonwealth Capital program 
could be the stimuli for those communities by giving the points though its clean 
energy and small project criteria. 
In addition, state level programs that are poorly coordinated or do not take 
account of policy interactions across agencies will also perform poorly.  With the 
improvement of the CC criteria in the future, the data from the program could be the 
best chance to understand the municipalities’ strength and weakness of smart growth.  
And it may contribute to the cooperation among the different government agencies.  
Although the incentive function of the CC program is quite limited, it is a good 
measure of the policies and can broaden the understanding between state agency and 
local authorities.  
7.4 Benefit Future Studies 
“Assessing the effects of state smart growth programs is difficult.  Land use 
policy evaluation is fraught with all the usual complexities of evaluation research, 
including measurement issues, counterfactuals, and questions of cause and effect” 
(Ingram et al., 2009).   This research also experienced those difficulties.  In Model 
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II, the towns with more compact development patterns usually have higher CC scores. 
But it is hard to tell what happened first between smart growth policies and land 
patterns.  I think it may take a long time and more accurate data and methods to 
examine the questions for Model II.   
Ingram et al. (2009) provides a few dimensions of sprawl index in his recent 
research, but most of his indicators are based on the county level data.  They are not 
applicable to the town level measurement, particularly the towns with relatively stable 
status like in Massachusetts.  I think future studies may focus more on the collection 
of data for sprawl outcomes.  More creative ideas for data collection and models 
design are expected in the future.  In regard to those issues, the future research 
questions might include: What are the relationships between smart growth policies 
and historic districts /Towns?  Massachusetts has a few urban clusters (e.g. Boston, 
Worcester, Springfield etc.), so what are the different outcomes when comparing their 
land use pattern with local smart growth policies? Why do they make a difference?   
In addition, this research implies that sprawl is a net-effect phenomena and the 
cluster of sprawl in a region may weaken the effectiveness of town’s smart growth 
efforts.  It is a good direction to explore with more accurate data and better designed 
models in the future.  To what level has the net-effect of urban sprawl influenced the 
effectiveness of local smart growth efforts? 
Ingram et al. (2009)’s research gives me another instructive message: 
“achieving smart growth is possible, but states must remain focused on their key 
policy goals.  No single approach is right for all states.  The most successful states 
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use a variety of regulatory controls, market incentives, and institutional policies to 
achieve their objectives…”  As this research concludes, the Commonwealth Capital 
program is not perfect in encouraging the competition and to what level the incentive 
purpose works is not clear.  The evaluation of the CC program in this research is 
quite preliminary due to its limited years of the implementation.  The future study 
could further investigate the CC program and make sophisticated comparison studies.  
The research questions can include: How can we improve/adjust the CC program? 
What implications can there be when comparing the CC program with other state 
level smart growth programs in Massachusetts or other states?   
Last, I think the qualitative methodology of this research can address more 
interesting questions in the future.  For example, the theoretical 
perspective/lens/framework of the research could be advocacy/participatory planning 
theories, which can be discussed with the findings of Model I (the reasons for local 
smart growth efforts), to answer the questions: what participatory process has 
improved the towns’ CC score significantly? What creative procedures can be 
introduced at town meeting to communicate the general public effectively in regard to 
the smart growth policies? 
In conclusion the Commonwealth Capital program could give us broad 
opportunities to investigate various research questions due to its creativity and 
flexibility.  I hope this dissertation sheds light on a few issues about municipal smart 
growth efforts and inspires future researchers to further explore this program. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMMONWEALTH CAPITAL SCORE CARD, 2005-2010 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE AND CONSENT FORM 
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APPENDIX C 
COMMONTEALTH CAPITAL SCORE FY05-FY10 
Source: www.mass.gov (Obtained Sept 2010) 
COMMUNITY Applied FY'05 FY'07/06 FY'08 FY'09 FY'10 
ABINGTON No 0 76 68 66 56
ACTON No 0 101 0 98 0
ACUSHNET No 50 44 0 0 0
ADAMS No 96 0 0 0 0
AGAWAM No 66 77 0 68 0
ALFORD No 40 36 0 0 0
AMESBURY No 0 109 0 90 0
AMHERST Yes 100 113 94 105 110
ANDOVER Yes 83 94 83 0 88
AQUINNAH No 0 0 0 0 0
ARLINGTON No 57 48 53 55 51
ASHBURNHAM No 69 67 87 78 0
ASHBY No 0 50 65 62 63
ASHFIELD No 66 67 0 53 0
ASHLAND No 0 92 0 86 0
ATHOL No 0 75 0 0 0
ATTLEBORO No 66 0 0 66 0
AUBURN No 0 49 61 0 0
AVON No 0 40 0 32 51
AYER No 68 0 0 0 0
BARNSTABLE Yes 106 90 117 125 129
BARRE No 0 0 0 0 0
BECKET No 0 64 0 52 0
BEDFORD No 0 0 0 0 0
BELCHERTOWN Yes 72 77 65 0 81
BELLINGHAM No 0 54 0 0 80
BELMONT No 0 70 67 0 0
BERKLEY No 0 17 0 0 0
BERLIN No 68 0 0 0 71
BERNARDSTON Yes 0 52 41 35 42
BEVERLY Yes 0 0 98 86 96
BILLERICA Yes 53 77 68 52 61
BLACKSTONE No 0 0 0 0 0
BLANDFORD No 37 53 46 33 0
BOLTON No 62 71 0 0 69
BOSTON Yes 101 89 94 96 106
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BOURNE No 0 62 46 0 0
BOXBOROUGH No 56 0 67 78 0
BOXFORD No 0 59 69 73 77
BOYLSTON No 58 0 0 0 0
BRAINTREE No 0 74 67 79 84
BREWSTER Yes 27 68 85 93 98
BRIDGEWATER Yes 0 70 66 29 0
BRIMFIELD No 0 45 0 0 49
BROCKTON No 85 92 75 34 58
BROOKFIELD No 0 0 0 51 61
BROOKLINE Yes 68 90 87 76 0
BUCKLAND No 55 73 69 0 0
BURLINGTON No 76 84 0 73 75
CAMBRIDGE Yes 99 110 111 117 112
CANTON No 77 0 0 0 0
CARLISLE No 44 0 33 46 58
CARVER Yes 51 48 0 0 79
CHARLEMONT No 0 66 0 47 0
CHARLTON No 67 73 0 61 0
CHATHAM Yes 0 87 0 84 0
CHELMSFORD No 0 0 0 0 0
CHELSEA Yes 87 85 95 85 89
CHESHIRE No 26 55 0 0 0
CHESTER No 62 56 0 0 0
CHESTERFIELD No 0 62 0 0 0
CHICOPEE Yes 65 82 41 60 57
CHILMARK No 0 0 0 0 0
CLARKSBURG No 21 0 35 0 21
CLINTON No 51 65 63 0 33
COHASSET Yes 0 109 101 73 88
COLRAIN No 58 68 0 0 0
CONCORD Yes 0 81 68 57 0
CONWAY No 0 61 55 0 0
CUMMINGTON No 31 66 0 0 0
DALTON No 0 65 0 0 0
DANVERS No 0 85 0 94 91
DARTMOUTH Yes 94 90 0 66 0
DEDHAM No 49 71 86 101 113
DEERFIELD No 77 88 0 0 0
DENNIS Yes 59 88 79 112 112
DEVENS No 0 79 75 84 0
DIGHTON No 0 0 0 0 0
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DOUGLAS No 70 72 0 83 0
DOVER No 0 0 0 0 0
DRACUT Yes 89 90 0 56 46
DUDLEY No 82 0 0 0 0
DUNSTABLE Yes 35 66 60 52 56
DUXBURY No 71 61 73 86 82
EAST 
BRIDGEWATER No 0 53 0 0 0
EAST 
BROOKFIELD No 0 54 54 0 0
EAST 
LONGMEADOW No 47 43 0 0 0
EASTHAM No 68 73 71 81 80
EASTHAMPTON No 84 97 104 91 0
EASTON Yes 0 82 62 63 80
EDGARTOWN No 0 0 0 0 0
EGREMONT Yes 53 57 0 41 23
ERVING No 0 78 75 0 0
ESSEX No 0 0 0 0 0
EVERETT Yes 44 0 0 34 30
FAIRHAVEN Yes 57 70 64 72 88
FALL RIVER Yes 92 98 68 69 0
FALMOUTH Yes 0 90 0 105 97
FITCHBURG No 91 107 111 108 0
FLORIDA No 0 0 0 0 17
FOXBOROUGH Yes 0 77 0 74 78
FRAMINGHAM Yes 93 92 112 105 109
FRANKLIN No 90 99 96 90 103
FREETOWN No 0 25 0 0 0
GARDNER No 86 104 95 80 0
GEORGETOWN No 0 0 0 0 0
GILL No 58 58 0 0 0
GLOUCESTER Yes 105 0 92 0 96
GOSHEN Yes 35 0 0 0 0
GOSNOLD No 0 0 0 0 0
GRAFTON No 56 91 0 88 0
GRANBY No 46 0 31 23 0
GRANVILLE No 23 31 0 31 0
GREAT 
BARRINGTON No 57 81 79 0 81
GREENFIELD Yes 77 86 95 83 86
GROTON Yes 81 91 105 102 104
GROVELAND No 0 63 0 0 51
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HADLEY No 73 85 0 0 0
HALIFAX No 0 0 0 0 0
HAMILTON Yes 45 56 0 0 0
HAMPDEN No 26 34 0 0 30
HANCOCK No 0 0 0 0 0
HANOVER No 0 0 0 40 0
HANSON No 0 0 0 0 50
HARDWICK No 61 64 0 65 49
HARVARD No 0 0 0 0 54
HARWICH Yes 55 84 0 55 73
HATFIELD No 85 82 68 0 68
HAVERHILL No 66 77 0 0 82
HAWLEY No 0 0 0 0 0
HEATH No 69 66 0 0 0
HINGHAM No 97 93 0 95 0
HINSDALE No 26 0 0 0 0
HOLBROOK No 73 74 0 0 42
HOLDEN No 0 73 0 75 0
HOLLAND No 0 40 0 54 0
HOLLISTON Yes 61 76 82 0 47
HOLYOKE No 94 113 100 116 111
HOPEDALE No 0 0 0 0 0
HOPKINTON Yes 71 84 83 78 0
HUBBARDSTON No 55 59 92 0 0
HUDSON No 91 99 0 86 0
HULL No 0 0 0 0 62
HUNTINGTON No 0 47 0 0 46
IPSWICH No 0 116 114 0 106
KINGSTON Yes 0 0 0 65 56
LAKEVILLE No 53 39 0 39 51
LANCASTER Yes 61 78 0 0 0
LANESBOROUGH No 16 45 0 30 0
LAWRENCE No 60 67 92 79 77
LEE No 64 0 0 0 74
LEICESTER No 0 58 0 0 46
LENOX No 0 53 0 66 0
LEOMINSTER Yes 71 103 100 88 87
LEVERETT No 0 75 0 0 0
LEXINGTON Yes 0 75 0 96 112
LEYDEN No 0 56 0 0 0
LINCOLN No 0 0 69 0 90
LITTLETON Yes 59 53 0 61 71
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LONGMEADOW No 18 51 48 54 0
LOWELL Yes 85 107 91 94 96
LUDLOW Yes 0 38 76 0 75
LUNENBURG No 41 0 0 67 71
LYNN Yes 76 76 82 77 53
LYNNFIELD No 0 0 0 63 0
MALDEN Yes 65 86 72 61 81
MANCHESTER No 0 0 0 0 0
MANSFIELD Yes 58 99 93 96 100
MARBLEHEAD No 0 0 0 0 0
MARION No 48 62 55 0 0
MARLBOROUGH No 90 78 0 0 0
MARSHFIELD Yes 71 82 67 75 0
MASHPEE No 0 93 0 95 0
MATTAPOISETT No 34 43 0 40 48
MAYNARD No 59 77 0 89 0
MEDFIELD No 0 0 43 0 57
MEDFORD No 70 82 0 73 0
MEDWAY No 53 46 0 66 86
MELROSE Yes 40 0 95 110 0
MENDON Yes 0 0 0 41 0
MERRIMAC No 0 0 0 0 0
METHUEN No 40 0 0 52 0
MIDDLEBOROUGH No 0 109 96 90 102
MIDDLEFIELD No 32 41 40 0 29
MIDDLETON No 0 0 0 0 0
MILFORD Yes 0 82 0 0 0
MILLBURY No 0 86 0 0 84
MILLIS No 64 67 0 0 0
MILLVILLE No 0 44 0 8 0
MILTON No 42 0 0 0 0
MONROE No 0 0 0 30 0
MONSON No 50 70 0 0 74
MONTAGUE No 95 90 74 0 72
MONTEREY No 21 29 0 32 19
MONTGOMERY No 0 24 0 21 0
MT WASHINGTON No 0 0 0 0 0
NAHANT No 0 0 0 0 0
NANTUCKET Yes 98 105 109 105 117
NATICK Yes 71 0 50 0 71
NEEDHAM No 58 63 81 0 0
NEW ASHFORD No 0 0 0 0 0
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NEW BEDFORD No 92 98 0 91 84
NEW BRAINTREE No 12 23 0 0 0
NEW MARLBORO No 33 36 0 28 0
NEW SALEM No 0 41 0 0 0
NEWBURY No 0 99 0 0 0
NEWBURYPORT Yes 0 100 0 114 113
NEWTON No 86 86 77 0 0
NORFOLK No 0 73 83 74 0
NORTH ADAMS No 72 88 93 87 94
NORTH ANDOVER Yes 90 81 0 74 75
N. 
ATTLEBOROUGH No 67 0 30 31 21
NORTH 
BROOKFIELD No 0 33 0 0 0
NORTH READING Yes 0 66 0 77 0
NORTHAMPTON Yes 129 128 131 118 130
NORTHBOROUGH Yes 82 76 0 0 0
NORTHBRIDGE No 61 64 69 0 0
NORTHFIELD No 68 90 0 0 0
NORTON No 61 0 0 0 48
NORWELL No 0 0 65 0 0
NORWOOD Yes 63 82 0 0 0
OAK BLUFFS No 0 83 95 97 87
OAKHAM Yes 0 0 0 0 0
ORANGE No 88 103 100 88 101
ORLEANS Yes 86 99 105 88 89
OTIS No 0 35 0 0 0
OXFORD No 0 40 51 0 0
PALMER No 0 80 87 62 60
PAXTON No 0 50 63 0 46
PEABODY No 78 95 92 101 94
PELHAM No 25 19 0 29 0
PEMBROKE Yes 53 67 61 51 59
PEPPERELL No 44 65 57 0 56
PERU No 27 0 0 13 0
PETERSHAM No 58 50 49 0 57
PHILLIPSTON No 0 0 0 0 0
PITTSFIELD Yes 79 89 90 104 104
PLAINFIELD No 22 32 0 0 0
PLAINVILLE Yes 0 33 0 20 22
PLYMOUTH Yes 87 112 112 101 111
PLYMPTON No 23 46 0 0 0
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PRINCETON No 0 41 44 60 0
PROVINCETOWN Yes 0 95 101 97 106
QUINCY No 72 83 107 92 111
RANDOLPH Yes 0 72 58 66 0
RAYNHAM Yes 0 89 57 0 61
READING No 83 85 74 84 0
REHOBOTH No 0 0 36 0 52
REVERE Yes 84 94 96 78 90
RICHMOND No 0 0 0 0 13
ROCHESTER Yes 22 35 0 43 0
ROCKLAND No 0 0 74 0 0
ROCKPORT No 75 75 0 0 75
ROWE No 0 0 0 0 0
ROWLEY Yes 0 95 0 0 0
ROYALSTON No 0 51 0 34 0
RUSSELL No 0 41 43 0 0
RUTLAND No 0 48 0 0 0
SALEM Yes 78 103 97 97 75
SALISBURY No 0 95 93 98 98
SANDISFIELD No 0 0 0 12 0
SANDWICH No 0 0 0 0 0
SAUGUS Yes 44 43 52 35 0
SAVOY No 35 0 0 28 18
SCITUATE Yes 76 102 0 90 84
SEEKONK Yes 0 33 0 38 61
SHARON No 62 53 66 92 85
SHEFFIELD No 42 72 0 0 41
SHELBURNE No 0 64 77 69 0
SHERBORN No 0 0 0 24 39
SHIRLEY No 62 66 0 0 0
SHREWSBURY No 0 73 0 68 66
SHUTESBURY No 50 0 0 68 0
SOMERSET No 47 0 0 0 0
SOMERVILLE Yes 94 94 99 100 112
SOUTH HADLEY No 81 0 81 0 69
SOUTHAMPTON Yes 45 58 64 72 71
SOUTHBOROUGH No 52 52 48 42 0
SOUTHBRIDGE No 0 74 0 47 0
SOUTHWICK Yes 63 66 72 61 66
SPENCER No 40 74 89 0 0
SPRINGFIELD Yes 93 63 84 71 78
STERLING Yes 47 0 0 59 75
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STOCKBRIDGE No 0 0 0 0 0
STONEHAM No 33 0 0 0 0
STOUGHTON No 67 53 0 62 56
STOW No 63 74 88 73 0
STURBRIDGE No 0 63 67 64 64
SUDBURY Yes 76 0 63 89 0
SUNDERLAND No 0 76 0 66 0
SUTTON No 0 0 0 0 0
SWAMPSCOTT No 0 0 0 0 0
SWANSEA No 0 50 0 0 0
TAUNTON Yes 46 68 81 70 65
TEMPLETON Yes 34 43 49 0 42
TEWKSBURY No 0 75 0 0 63
TISBURY No 0 0 0 0 71
TOLLAND No 11 0 0 0 0
TOPSFIELD No 53 99 0 0 93
TOWNSEND No 0 61 0 79 0
TRURO No 0 45 66 0 0
TYNGSBOROUGH Yes 49 40 0 0 0
TYRINGHAM No 0 0 0 0 0
UPTON Yes 0 71 0 0 0
UXBRIDGE No 0 55 56 49 0
WAKEFIELD Yes 60 74 0 0 61
WALES No 0 32 0 0 0
WALPOLE No 46 44 0 0 0
WALTHAM No 0 65 75 0 61
WARE Yes 55 78 0 0 0
WAREHAM Yes 53 82 81 0 0
WARREN No 0 0 0 52 0
WARWICK No 0 43 47 44 0
WASHINGTON No 0 0 0 0 0
WATERTOWN No 68 67 0 0 0
WAYLAND No 67 0 0 27 0
WEBSTER No 0 61 58 44 0
WELLESLEY No 0 72 0 0 0
WELLFLEET No 71 87 0 63 62
WENDELL No 71 66 0 0 0
WENHAM No 0 0 0 0 72
WEST BOYLSTON No 43 66 63 75 63
W. BRIDGEWATER No 0 0 0 0 0
WEST 
BROOKFIELD Yes 0 63 0 35 0
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WEST NEWBURY Yes 0 0 63 65 68
WEST 
SPRINGFIELD Yes 71 73 0 54 76
WEST 
STOCKBRIDGE No 0 53 0 0 0
WEST TISBURY No 0 82 0 45 0
WESTBOROUGH No 0 0 0 0 0
WESTFIELD Yes 94 74 88 0 0
WESTFORD Yes 80 96 0 73 0
WESTHAMPTON Yes 0 29 0 0 0
WESTMINSTER No 0 68 97 87 87
WESTON No 0 0 0 0 0
WESTPORT No 67 78 81 0 0
WESTWOOD No 0 75 0 0 67
WEYMOUTH No 0 92 0 84 0
WHATELY No 0 67 0 0 66
WHITMAN No 0 0 0 0 0
WILBRAHAM Yes 55 72 0 77 0
WILLIAMSBURG No 0 53 0 56 59
WILLIAMSTOWN No 84 77 0 79 0
WILMINGTON No 74 78 84 66 0
WINCHENDON No 0 99 99 106 103
WINCHESTER No 63 94 0 0 85
WINDSOR No 0 0 0 0 0
WINTHROP No 55 57 0 0 0
WOBURN No 68 76 83 70 0
WORCESTER Yes 80 104 97 101 95
WORTHINGTON No 57 55 0 0 0
WRENTHAM No 0 0 0 0 0
YARMOUTH Yes 0 83 97 0 79
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